Industrial Organziation game - Business Strategy &
Consider a game with competitive for market-share in a large region (a country or city).
Firm 1 initially makes a decision to either compete in the Eastern (E) or Western (W) part of a region, or to opt out entirely (O).
Once this decision has been made, Firm 1 and Firm 2 (who is already present in the region) simultaneously make a decision to be aggressive (A) or passive (P) in the region. Denote actions in the Eastern region without a prime (i.e. A and P) and those in the Western region with a prime (i.e. A` and P`).
We'll make the following assumptions about these firms -
If Firm 1 opts out, its payoff is 8 and the payoff for Firm 2 is 12
If Firm 1 ENTERS the Eastern region
- both firms receive 9 if both are AGGRESSIVE
- both firms receive 6 if both are PASSIVE
- if one plays AGGRESSIVE and the other plays PASSIVE, the aggresive firm gets 5 and the passive firm gets 2
If Firm 1 ENTERS the Western region
- both firms receive 2 if both are AGGRESSIVE
- both firms receive 7 if both are PASSIVE
- if one plays AGGRESSIVE and the other plays PASSIVE, the aggressive firm gets 10 and the passive firm gets 8
****** Write out the EXTENSIVE form of this game*****
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