The payoff matrix depicts potential payoffs in a non-sequential, non-repeating game. Blue numbers are for Player 1 and red numbers are for player 2.(This exact payoff matrix appears in 3 other questions on this exam.). The cooperative (collusive) equilibrium is:Player 1(70,80)0000(30,20)(40,40)(10,90)Strategy CStrategy DPlayer 2Strategy A40, 4010,90Strategy B30, 2070, 80

Ans. ) Given in the question is the payoff matrix that depicts the potential payoffs in a…

Answered: The payoff matrix depicts potential…

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2E

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Question 7 Consider the following extensive form game. The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of the game is X P2 Y P₂ D' C' N c' D' (2) () () (1) (1) (2) (2,4)
Suppose China and the US are deciding whether to join an international agreement to mitigate climate change. The matrix below contains payoffs that represent each country’s net benefit from their decisions. Use this information to answer Question 24. CHINA USA Join Agreement Do Not Join Agreement Join Agreement (100,100) (0,125) Do Not Join Agreement (125,0) (25,25) [24] What does each country decide to do in a Nash equilibrium? AND What is the efficient outcome? Nash: Efficient:
Iterative Elimination of Dominated Strategies Exercise 4.2 Consider the following normal form of a game. Use IEDS to reduce this game and find any Nash Equilibrium. X Y Z (60,50) (50,110) (70,90) (100,60) (70,70) (110,100) (110,70) (100,110) (40,40)
This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B). B Left Right (3, 1) (5,7) (4, 3) Center (1, 4) (2, 2) (3, 2) (6, 2) (4, 6) (5, 5) Up Middle Down Which of the following outcomes represents a Nash equilibrium in the game? (Up, Center) (Middle, Right) (Down, Left) (Down, Center)
Two rival companies competing in the same market need to decide their plans for future expansion of their stores. The Table below shows the possible outcomes of their mutually interdependent actions (payoffs are profits in £m) Giga Company Titanic Conglomerate No Change Refurbishment of existing stores Large Expansion No Change 30, 40 25, 35 15, 24 Refurbishment of existing stores 35, 30 28, 32 18, 33 Large Expansion 12, 22 18, 20 20, 25 The Nash equilibrium: (A) does not exist. (B) occurs when both firms choose Refurbishment of existing stores. (C) occurs when both firms choose Large Expansion. (D) occurs when both firms choose No Change.
GAME ZZZ B1 Player B A1 30, 30 Player A A2 20, 40 B2 40, 20 35, 35 In the Game ZZZ (see table above), all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second. In this game, neither player has a dominant strategy. the Nash equilibrium does not maximize the total payoff. there is no Nash equilibrium. the Nash equilibrium maximizes the total payoff.
Show that there does not exist a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the following extensive-form game. What is the mixed- strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium? R Player 1 M L Player 2 3
What is the difference between a cooperative and a noncooperative game? Give an example of each.
Problem 1. You are given the following bimatrix games. For each one, find all pure Nash equilibria. (a) (Prisoner's Dilemma) Player 2 Quiet 2, 2 3,0 Fink Quiet Fink 0,3 1,1 Player 1 (b) (Matching Pennies) Player 2 Нead Head 1,-1 Tails -1,1 Player 1 Tails -1,1 | 1, -1 (c) (Battle of the Sexes) Girl OK, football... OK, theatre... Football! Theatre! 1,5 0,0 0,0 5,1 Boy (d) (Battle of the Sexes... modified) Girl Football great, I will invite my dad Theatre! OK, football... OK, theatre... Football! 1,5 0,0 0,0 5, 1 0,0 -1 , 2 Boy
Player 2 Strategy A Strategy B Strategy 1 (1,4) (2,3) Player 1 Strategy 2 (6,5) (5,4) Consider the game depicted in the table above. The payout for player 1 is given first in parenthesis, with Player 2's payout second. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game? Strategy 1 and Strategy A Strategy 2 and Strategy A Strategy 2 and Strategy B This game does not have a Nash equilibrium
Here is a table representing the gains for the server if he serves on his opponent's forehand or backhand and for the receiver the gains if he returns on his forehand or backhand. Each player can choose to play the forehand or the backhand of the other player : Server D R D 50,50 80, 20 R 90,10 |20, 80 Receiver D Determine the Nash equilibrium(s) (pure strategies and mixed strategies).
Starbucks and Krispy Kreme are trying to decide whether or not to open a shop in the new Mall of Africa. They both prefer if the other firm opens a shop because they can draw bigger crowds but neither wants to be the only American-branded coffee shop in the Mall. The payoff matrix for this dilemma is below. Krispy Kreme Open Don't Open Starbucks Open (i) (ii) 5,5 2,6 Don't open (iii) (iii) 6,2 3,3 MCQ question 4 Find the Nash Equilibrium (Starbucks, Krispy Kreme) for the payoff matrix when the game is played simultaneously. A. (5:5) only. B. (6,2) only. C. (2,6) only. D. (3,3) only E. There is no stable Nash Equilibrium. MCQ question 5 Suppose that Starbucks goes first in choosing to open or not to open. What is the outcome for this game? A. (5:5) only. B. (6,2) only. C. (2,6) only. D. (3,3) only E. There is no stable Nash Equilibrium.

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