5 (Table) Assume that firm A and firm B are oligopolies and both charge $20 for a product and face roughly the same costs. Firm A is considering a price decrease to $15. Profits for each firm are given in the payoff matrix (A's profits listed first, B's profits listed second) shown in the table. How will firm B react? Firm B's Price $20 Firm B's Price $15 $60,000 $120,000 $80,000 $80,000 Firm A's Price $20 Firm A's Price $15 $100,000 $100,000 $120,000 $60,000 Firm B will lower its price to $15 and earn $80,000. Firm B will keep its price at $20 and earn $100,000. Firm B will keep its price at $20 and earn $60,000. Firm B will lower its price to $15 and earn $60,000. Panel Editor

5 (Table) Assume that firm A and firm B are oligopolies and both charge $20 for a product and face roughly the same costs. Firm A is considering a price decrease to $15. Profits for each firm are given in the payoff matrix (A's profits listed first, B's profits listed second) shown in the table. How will firm B react? Firm B's Price $20 Firm B's Price $15 $60,000 $120,000 $80,000 $80,000 Firm A's Price $20 Firm A's Price $15 $100,000 $100,000 $120,000 $60,000 Firm B will lower its price to $15 and earn $80,000. Firm B will keep its price at $20 and earn $100,000. Firm B will keep its price at $20 and earn $60,000. Firm B will lower its price to $15 and earn $60,000. Panel Editor

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

3. Demand for a good produced by a duopoly is given by P = 100 - Q. Both firms have constant marginal costs, MC = 20 and zero fixed costs. Firms can choose to maximize profit or revenue. Suppose firm 1 choose to maximise profit and firm 2 choose to maximise revenue. Determine the equilibrium price and quantity of each firm.
1. Characteristics of oligopoly An oligopolistic market structure is distinguished by several characteristics, one of which is difficult entry. Which of the following are other characteristics of this market structure? Check all that apply. Market control by many small firms Market control by a few large firms Neither mutual interdependence nor mutual dependence Either similar or identical products Mutual interdependence
17. In the following bargaining game, a firm (F) and a syndicate (S) have to share the benefits generated by their economic activity. Assume that the benefits are equal to 2 million euros. The game has three stages. Offers are alternating between F, S and F. In each stage, the player who has not offered how to share the benefits has the choice of accepting or rejecting the proposal made by the other player. If she accepts the proposal, the game ends and if she rejects, in the next stage, she will become the proposer. If the players do not reach any agreement, after the third proposal, both of them get a zero payoff. a) What will be agreement reached in equilibrium and in which time period will the agreement be reach if the discount factor of both players is & = 1/4? b) What will be agreement reached in equilibrium and in which time period will the agreement be reach if F has a discount factor 8p = 1/4 and S has 8s = 1/2? c) Compare the two agreements and try to provide an intuitive…
1 Consider two identical firms with a unit cost of production of $10 and a market demand of p= 60-y. (a) What is firm 1’s optimal output level as a function of firm 2’s output? (b) What is firm 2’s optimal output level as a function of firm 1’s output? (c) What is the Cournot equilibrium output level for these firms? (d) What is the Cournot equilibrium price level? Show your work step by step.
32
1. Consider the following game matrix. Player A Answer: Top Bottom Left a, b e, f Player B Right c, d g, h (a) If top and left are strictly dominant strategies, then what do we know the relationship of the parameters? (b) If (top, left) is a Nash equilibrium, then what do we know the relationship of the parameters? Answer: (c) If top and left are strictly dominant strategies, will (top, left) be a Nash equilibrium? Why? Answer: (d) If (top, left) is a Nash equilibrium, must the strategies be strictly dominant strategies? Why? Answer:
7) What is the significance of the mutual interdependence among the firms in an oligopolistic market?
2
D2) Explain this concept and give one practical example(oligopoly)
5
7
(REAL-WORLD APPLICATION) You are NOT required to read the oligopoly chapter in the textbook, but you already know quite a lot about it from our discussion of strategic interactions using game theory in weeks 2-3. This market structure is between monopoly and monopolistic competition, with only a handful of firms having a high degree of market power. Let's refresh your memory with the following example. Assume that the Australian low-cost airline industry consists of two firms and their situation can be represented by the following payoff matrix. Tigar Air Nothing Low Price More Advertising 0, 16 6, 6 Nothing 10, 10 2, 14 Jetstar Low Price 16, 0 12, 4 More Advertising 14, 2 4, 12 8, 8 a. Before solving the game, put yourself in the position of Jetstar and write down your action. Then independent of that, put yourself in the position of Tiger Air and write down your action. b. State all the dominated strategies in the full game, by which strategy they are dominated, and whether weakly or…