EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
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Chapter 5.9, Problem 2MQ
To determine
The total number of sheep on the common with three shepherds to that with two is to be compared.
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All of 5.2 and 5.3 please. I don’t really know how to explain nor how to show.
Questions 1-4
The Alpha, Beta, and Gamma residents of a village are
install street lights along the main street of the village
The marginal benefit (Am) of the streetlights is:
- Alpha: Am = 10.000-80x.
- Beta: Am = 8.000-90x.
- Gamma: Am = 14.000-70x
1. If a streetlight costs $8,000, what is the optimal
collective number of streetlights?
а. 25. b. 65. с. 100 d. 110
2. What is the marginal benefit of Alpha at the
optimal number of street lights?
а. О. b. 2,000 с. 3,500. d. 4,500.
3. What is the marginal benefit of Gamma at the
optimal number of street lights?
а. О. b. 6,000. с. 7,000 d. 9,000
4. How will Citizen Beta react to the proposal to
levy a flat tax of $5,000 per citizen per streetlight
to fund the development of streetlights? He
a. Will be willing to pay the tax.
b. will refuse to pay the tax.
c. is unable to conclude whether Beta will be
willing to pay the tax or not. d. will be indifferent to
the "neither for nor against" street lights.
3 ranchers use a grassland to feed their cows. The ranchers must choose how many cows
-
0-106² per cow, where G is
3
to raise. The benefit of raising a cow for a rancher is 100 –
the total quantity of cows using the grassland. The marginal cost of raising a cow is 10.
Hence, the net benefit of raising cows for any rancher is (100-1G²) g – 10g, where
3
g is the quantity of cows raised by the rancher. What is the total quantity of cows using
the grassland, implied by the Nash Equilibrium?
जोळ जोप
√5
12
Chapter 5 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 5.3 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.3 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5.4 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.4 - Prob. 2MQCh. 5.4 - Prob. 3MQCh. 5.4 - Prob. 4MQCh. 5.5 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.5 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5.5 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.5 - Prob. 2MQ
Ch. 5.6 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.6 - Prob. 2MQCh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.2TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.2MQCh. 5.9 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.9 - Prob. 2MQCh. 5.9 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.9 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5 - Prob. 1RQCh. 5 - Prob. 2RQCh. 5 - Prob. 3RQCh. 5 - Prob. 4RQCh. 5 - Prob. 5RQCh. 5 - Prob. 6RQCh. 5 - Prob. 7RQCh. 5 - Prob. 8RQCh. 5 - Prob. 9RQCh. 5 - Prob. 10RQCh. 5 - Prob. 5.1PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.2PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.3PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.5PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.6PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.7PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.8PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.9PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.10P
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