EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 5, Problem 5.3P
A
To determine
Detail the extensive form in the simultaneous move game.
B
To determine
Supposing that now sequential move is chosen, starting with A and then B, detail the extensive form for this sequence.
C
To determine
Detail in the normal form for the sequential move game.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solutionStudents have asked these similar questions
A and B are competitors in the mobile phone industry. Both A and B have to decide whether to
participate or not to participate in a Phone for the Future Trade Fair next month. The matrix payoff
below shows the profits (USD million) corresponding to their actions.
a) What is the Nash equilibrium of the above game?
b) Is the Nash equilibrium Pareto Optima? Explain.
c) Suppose B is pessimistic of A's rationality, what is B's
strategy? Compare and comment on B's strategy in (a) and (c).
A
Participate Do not participate
B Participate
Do not participate 400,1000 200,200
500,500
1000,400
Consider the following game in normal form.
Not cooperate
Cooperate
Not cooperate
20,20
50,0
Cooperate
0,50
40,40
What is Nash equilibrium? Is it efficient? Why?
What needs to be complied with so that the players would like to cooperate? What happens when one of the players does not cooperate? Why? Define trigger strategy.
Calculate the discount factor (δ) that would make both players decide to cooperate.
Selten's Horse: Consider the three-person game described in Figure 15.6,
known as Selten's horse (for the obvious reason).
What are the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game?
Which of the Bayesian Nash equilibria that you found in (a) are perfect
Bayesian equilibria?
c.
b.
Which of the Bayesian Nash equilibria that you found in (a) are
sequential equilibria?
Chapter 5 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 5.3 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.3 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5.4 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.4 - Prob. 2MQCh. 5.4 - Prob. 3MQCh. 5.4 - Prob. 4MQCh. 5.5 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.5 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5.5 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.5 - Prob. 2MQ
Ch. 5.6 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.6 - Prob. 2MQCh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.2TTACh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 5.6 - Prob. 1.2MQCh. 5.9 - Prob. 1MQCh. 5.9 - Prob. 2MQCh. 5.9 - Prob. 1TTACh. 5.9 - Prob. 2TTACh. 5 - Prob. 1RQCh. 5 - Prob. 2RQCh. 5 - Prob. 3RQCh. 5 - Prob. 4RQCh. 5 - Prob. 5RQCh. 5 - Prob. 6RQCh. 5 - Prob. 7RQCh. 5 - Prob. 8RQCh. 5 - Prob. 9RQCh. 5 - Prob. 10RQCh. 5 - Prob. 5.1PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.2PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.3PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.5PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.6PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.7PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.8PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.9PCh. 5 - Prob. 5.10P
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Describe the game and find all Nash equilibria in the following situation: Each of two players chooses a non-negative number. In the choice (a1, a2), the payoff of the first player is equal to a1(a2 - a1), and the payoff of the second player is equal to a2(1 – a1 – a2).arrow_forwardConsider the following extensive form of the game. The outcome in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is [ Select one option] ["Large; Don't Enter", "Large; Enter", "Small; Don't Enter", "Small; Enter"]. It would not pay for the incumbent to produce the large quantity if its profits from producing large quantity is less than $ [ Select one option ] ["50", "60", "100", "0"].arrow_forwardGame theory can capture strategic situations where your outcome depends not only upon your own choice but also upon the choice of another. Present a coordination game of your choice where you and another player each have two choices or strategies. Explain in words the Nash Equilibrium concept, and identify the Nash equilibrium or Nash equilibria for your game. Explain why the outcomes that are not Nash equilibria are not.arrow_forward
- Which is the correct mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for the below game? A Confess (3,2) Doesn't (0,0) confess (1/3); (2/3) (2/5); (3/5) (1/2): (1/2) B Confess (1/4); (3/4) Doesn't confess (0,0) (2,3)arrow_forwardLet G be the following static game. Rose Colin A A (3,4) B (4,2) B (1,5) (0, 1) (a) Determine the pure Nash equilibria of G. (b) Rose A, B, Colin A, B is a mixed Nash equilibrium of H. (You do not have to verify this.) Determine the expected payoffs of both players given that they choose their strategies according to this Nash equilibrium. (c) Draw the payoff polygon of H. Indicate on your diagram the points corresponding to the Nash equilibria of H, and the points corresponding to Pareto optimal solu- tions of H.arrow_forwardConsider a Centipede game below. Player 1 moves first and he can choose either L or R. If player 1 chooses R; then Player 2 moves choosing either L or R and if he chooses R then Player 1 moves choosing either L or R and then finally player 2 moves. 1 R 2 R 1 R 2 R 9,9 L 2,0 0,4 6,2 4,8 a. Represent this game in a normal form b. Find all the Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium or equilibria c. Find all the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this gamearrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
- Microeconomics: Principles & PolicyEconomicsISBN:9781337794992Author:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. SolowPublisher:Cengage Learning
- Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningExploring EconomicsEconomicsISBN:9781544336329Author:Robert L. SextonPublisher:SAGE Publications, IncManagerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...EconomicsISBN:9781305506381Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. HarrisPublisher:Cengage Learning
Microeconomics: Principles & Policy
Economics
ISBN:9781337794992
Author:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Exploring Economics
Economics
ISBN:9781544336329
Author:Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:SAGE Publications, Inc
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:Cengage Learning