Microeconomics
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781259915727
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 14, Problem 1P
To determine
The punishment strategy for the cheating firm.
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Consider a “punishment” variation of the two-firm oligopoly situation shown in Figure 14.1. Suppose that if one firm sets a low price while the other sets a high price, then the firm setting the high price can fine the firm setting the low price. Suppose that whenever a fine is imposed, X dollars is taken from the low-price firm and given to the high-price firm. What is the smallest amount that the fine X can be such that both firms will want to always set the high price?
Boulder has several ski and snowboard retailers that sell similar brands. Prices across these retails are relatively stable during preseason (ski/snowboard season) and midseason, but become volatile postseason. For the past few years, when one retailer slashed prices (especially postseason), other retailers followed suit. All retailers behave as oligopolists. Suppose that retailer A faces an inverse demand of p = 1,500 – 1.5Q, when the other retailers match retailer A’s price changes, and p=1200 – 0.7Q, when the other retailers don't match retailer A’s price changes. Suppose also that retailer A's cost function is C(Q) = 20,000 + 10Q + 0.8Q2.
Question: Under these conditions, what is the most profit retailer A can make?
Question 2
Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb=268-10Qb.
The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1= 6Q
The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2=4Q
(Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $102 and firm 2 had a fixed cost of $104
What are the profits of firm 2? (hint 567.26)
How much consumer surplus is created by industry transactions? (hint 1333.34)
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Chapter 14 Solutions
Microeconomics
Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 1QQCh. 14.2 - The D2e segment of the demand curve D2eD1 in graph...Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 3QQCh. 14.2 - Prob. 4QQCh. 14 - Prob. 1DQCh. 14 - Prob. 2DQCh. 14 - Prob. 3DQCh. 14 - Prob. 4DQCh. 14 - Prob. 5DQCh. 14 - Prob. 6DQ
Ch. 14 - Prob. 7DQCh. 14 - Prob. 8DQCh. 14 - Prob. 9DQCh. 14 - Prob. 10DQCh. 14 - Prob. 11DQCh. 14 - Prob. 12DQCh. 14 - Prob. 13DQCh. 14 - Prob. 14DQCh. 14 - Prob. 1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 5RQCh. 14 - Prob. 6RQCh. 14 - Prob. 7RQCh. 14 - Prob. 8RQCh. 14 - Prob. 9RQCh. 14 - Prob. 10RQCh. 14 - Prob. 1PCh. 14 - Prob. 2PCh. 14 - Prob. 3P
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