Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 13, Problem 12E
To determine
To Ascertain:
Supposing the given condition, explain if the statement satisfies or not with reasons.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solution
Students have asked these similar questions
Consider the following game matrix with two players- Player 1 and Player 2 with their respective strategies.
Which of the following statements is correct such as x>y>b>a
Players
Player2
Player 1
A
B
C
D
(Y, Y)
(b, x)
(x, a)
(AE) is the one of many Nash equilibria
(C) is the unique Nash equilibria
(C. D) is the unique Nash equilibria
(A. E) and (B. F) are two Nash equilibria
E
(a, b)
(x, y)
(y, a)
F
(a,x)
(a, b)
(b, b)
Untied and Air ’R’ Us are the only two airlines operating flights between Collegeville and Bigtown. Each airline can charge either a high price or a low price for a ticket. The accompanying matrix shows their payoffs, in profits per seat (in dollars), for any choice that the two airlines can make.
Suppose the two airlines play a one-shot game—that is, they interact only once and never again.
What will be the Nash (noncooperative) equilibrium in this one-shot
game?
Explain why this is the likely outcome.
Now suppose the two airlines play this game twice. Each airline then considers the future and decides on a “tit-for-tat” strategy, that is, it starts off charging the high price in the first period, and then in the second period it does whatever the other airline did in the previous period. If both play this…
Imagine two Pizzerias are playing a static game where the firms have to choose their strategies simultaneously, selecting a strategy that maximizes its profit given what it believes the other firm will do. Their decision is how many pizzas to produce. They can choose between producing 100, 150 or 200 pizzas each. The profit for respective firm is showed in the payoff matrix below.
a) What is the solution (if there is one) and also describe the characteristic features of this game.
b) If this game was played repeatedly, could that potentially change the outcome of the game? In your answer, you are expected to motivate and describe how.
Chapter 13 Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Refer to the normal-form game of price competition in the payoff matrix below. Suppose the game is infinitely repeated, and the interest rate is 10 percent. Both firms agree to charge a high price, provided no player has charged a low price in the past. (a) If both firms stick to this agreement, then what is the present value of firm A's payoffs? Please show your calculations. (b) If firm A cheats, what is the present value of the returns for Firm A for cheating? Please show your calculations.arrow_forwardLet's think about a traditional game theory principal agent game. In this game we have two players, Lauren and Jason Lauren will choose to invest $500 dollars with Jason If she doesn't invest the money, she keeps the $500 and Jason gets nothing If she does invest the money, then Jason has a choice-he can cooperate by investing Lauren's money and then splitting the profit of another $500. This would give Lauren $750 (her original $500 investment plus $250 of profit) and would give Jason $250. Jason's other choice is to appropriate, or to steal Lauren's money and not invest it. If he does this, Lauren ends up with nothing and Jason has the entire $500. The following diagram outlines this game. Principal Agent Game Jason (750.250) Invest appropriate 10. 500) doninve What will happen in this game? Lauren will not invest Lauren will invest and Jason will cooperate Lauren will invest and Jason will appropriate Next pagearrow_forwardHow does backward induction affect decision-making in multi-stage games with complete information, particularly in the context of strategic interactions between firms in an oligopolistic market?arrow_forward
- Two oligopolistic aluminium manufacturers are engaged in bitter competition with one another. Both firms, Big Aluminium Giant (BAG) and Little Aluminium Giant (LAG), are deciding whether to expand capacity or not. The table below shows payoffs for the firms under various scenarios. Suppose the game is played sequentially and LAG make their decision first. What are the payoffs to each firm in the equilibrium of this game? first number in each cell is the payoff of LAG. Big Aluminium Giant Don't Expand Expand Little Aluminium Giant Don't Expand 2, 3 1, 4 Expand 3, 1 2, 2 OA. 2, 3 OB. 3, 1 OC. 1,4 OD.2, 2 OE. There is no equilibrium in this gamearrow_forwardConsider the game shown below. In this game, players 1 and 2 must move at the same time without knowledge of the other player’s move. Player 1’s choices are shown in the row headings (A/B), Player 2’s choices are shown in the column headings (C/D). The first payoff is for the row player (Player1) and the second payoff is for the column player (Player 2). Player 2 Player 1 C D A 8, 3 2, 4 B 7, 4 3, 5 Pick the correct answer: Player 1: Has a dominant strategy to choose A Has a dominant strategy to choose B Has a dominant strategy to choose C Has a dominant strategy to choose D Does not have a dominant strategy Player 2: Has a dominant strategy to choose A Has a dominant strategy to choose B Has a dominant strategy to choose C Has a dominant strategy to choose D Does not have a dominant strategy The Nash equilibrium outcome to this game is: A/C A/D B/C B/D There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this gamearrow_forwardGame theory. Pretend you're in the following situation: A and B are two different cloth making enterprises. Both companies A and B were successful in bringing their products to market. However, because company A was the first to make a move, a significant portion of the country's population chose to use the product manufactured by company A because they had already established a positive reputation in the market. Although the revenues of company A were increasing, the company B was struggling to maintain its position in the market with their goods. Because firm A was the first to make a move, it enjoys a competitive advantage over company B in the marketplace. 1. Prove that the situation IS а game (explain strategic interaction/conflict) and solve the game with appropriate approach.arrow_forward
- Perrier and Apollinaris. Perrier and Apollinaris are two companies that sell mineral water in Tampa, FL. Each company has a fixed cost of $5,000 per period, regardless whether they sell anything or not. The two companies are competing for the same market and each firm must choose a high price ($2 per bottle) or a low price ($1 per bottle). Here are the rules of the game: At a price of $2, 5,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. At a price of $1, 10,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. If both companies charge the same price, they split the sales evenly between them. If one company charges a higher price, the company with the lower price sells the whole amount and the company with the higher price sells nothing. Payoffs are total profits. In this case, Apollinaris has: no dominant strategy. Perrier has a dominant strategy of P=$1. a dominant strategy of P=$1. Perrier also has a dominant strategy of P=$2. a dominant strategy…arrow_forwardIntel and AMD are the two dominant producers of microchip processors. The following matrix gives the payoffs (in millions of dollars) of the two firms for different combinations of their pricing strategies. The first number is Intel's payoff and the second AMD's. AMD Intel Low Price High Price Low Price 35, 30 30, 60 High Price 70,25 65,55 O If this game is played sequentially, the Nash equilibrium will not change irrespective of who moves first. If this one-shot game is repeated for 10 times, the Nash equilibrium is for both firms to choose High Price. O In this game, Pareto criterion leads both firms to choose High Price. This game is an example of coordination game.arrow_forwardPerrier and Apollinaris. Perrier and Apollinaris are two companies that sell mineral water in Tampa, FL. Each company has a fixed cost of $5,000 per period, regardless whether they sell anything or not. The two companies are competing for the same market and each firm must choose a high price ($2 per bottle) or a low price ($1 per bottle). Here are the rules of the game: At a price of $2, 5,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. At a price of $1, 10,000 bottles can be sold for total revenue of $10,000. If both companies charge the same price, they split the sales evenly between them. If one company charges a higher price, the company with the lower price sells the whole amount and the company with the higher price sells nothing. Payoffs are total profits. In this case, the NE is(are): (P=$2, P=$1). (P=$1, P=$2). (P=$2, P=$2). (P=$1, P=$1).arrow_forward
- Is there a Nash Equilibrium for this game? If so, what is it? O The Nash Equilibrium is for both first to choose the high price. O The Nash Equilibrium is for both first to choose the low price. O The Nash Equilibrium is for Chevron to choose the high price while Shell chooses the low price. O The Nash Equilibrium is for Shell to choose the high price while Chevron chooses the low price. O There is no Nash Equilibrium for this game.arrow_forwardConsider the following extensive form of the game. The outcome in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is [ Select one option] ["Large; Don't Enter", "Large; Enter", "Small; Don't Enter", "Small; Enter"]. It would not pay for the incumbent to produce the large quantity if its profits from producing large quantity is less than $ [ Select one option ] ["50", "60", "100", "0"].arrow_forwardTwo oligopolistic aluminium manufacturers are engaged in bitter competition with one another. Both firms, Big Aluminium Giant (BAG) and Little Aluminium Giant (LAG), are deciding whether to expand capacity or not. The table below shows payoffs for the firms under various scenarios. The first number in each cell is the payoff of LAG. Suppose the game is played sequentially and LAG make their decision first. What are the payoffs to each firm in the equilibrium of this game? Big Aluminium Giant Don't Expand Expand Little Aluminium Giant 1, 4 Don't Expand Expand 2, 3 3, 1 2, 2 O A. 2, 3 OB. 3, 1 OC.1, 4 OD. 2, 2 E. There is no equilibrium in this gamearrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...EconomicsISBN:9781305506381Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. HarrisPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:Cengage Learning