Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 13, Problem 1.2CE
To determine
To describe:
The likely impact on the tactical competition.
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In 2004–2006, for the first time Boeing produced fewer planes than Airbus. If Boeing finds itself less profitable at 60 percent market share than at 45 percent, what is the likely impact on the Airbus-Boeing tactical competition?
In 1983, Motorola accounted for seventy five percent of the mobile phone market. But by 2019, its market share had shrunk to just 2.2%. In 1983, the Motorola launched one of the world’s first commercially available mobile phones—the DynaTAC 8000X. Motorola went on to launch a few more devices over the next few years and quickly became a dominant player in the emerging industry. In the early days of the market, the company’s only serious competitor was Finnish multinational Nokia. By the mid-1990s, other competitors like Sony and Siemens started to gain some solid footing, which chipped away at Motorola’s dominance. In September 1995, the company’s market share was down to 32.1%. By January 1999, Nokia surpassed Motorola as the leading mobile phone manufacturer, accounting for 21.4% of global market share. That put it just slightly ahead of Motorola’s 20.8%.
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Suppose Giocattolo of Italy and American Toy Company of the United States are the only two firms producing toys for sale in the U.S. market. Each
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Suppose Giocattolo and American Toy Company operate as competitors, and the cost schedules of each company are MCo = ATCO = $10.
On the following graph, use the grey point (star symbol) to identify the competitive market equilibrium. Then, use the green triangle (triangle
symbols) to identify consumer surplus in this case.
Note: Select and drag the point from the palette to the graph. Dashed drop lines will automatically extend to both axes. Then select and drag the
shaded region from the palette to the graph. To resize the shaded region, select one of the points and move to the desired position.
?
PRICE (Dollars per toy)
20
18
16
14
10
00
6
4
2
0…
Chapter 13 Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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