Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 13, Problem 10E
To determine
To Ascertain:
Explain with reasons about the given scenario and its outcomes.
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Suppose that there are only two firms in a market in which demand is given by p = 64 - Q, where Q is the total production of the two firms. Each firm can choose either a low level of output, qL = 15, or a high level of output, qH = 20. The unit cost of production for both firms is $4. Write down the normal-form representation of the game in which the strategic variable for each firm is the quantity of output and the firms make their choices simultaneously. Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game (quantities produced and market price).
Game theory can capture strategic situations where your outcome depends not only upon your own choice but also upon the choice of another. Present a coordination game of your choice where you and another player each have two choices or strategies. Explain in words the Nash Equilibrium concept, and identify the Nash equilibrium or Nash equilibria for your game. Explain why the outcomes that are not Nash equilibria are not.
Prove that in the variation on the centipede game given in figure 14.5(b) the unique sequential equilibrium described is, in fact, the unique Nash equilibrium. (Hint: Take some presumed Nash equilibrium and suppose information set 2n+ 1 [for player 2] is the first unreached information set. Derive an immediate contradiction. Then suppose that node (2n) t is the first unreached information set and derive a contradiction that is one degree removed from immediate.)
Chapter 13 Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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