Suppose that two firms, Lucky Bird and Full Coop, are the only sellers of seitan buffalo wings in some hypothetical market. The following payoff matrix gives the profit (in millions of dollars) earned by each company depending on whether or not it chooses to advertise: Full Coop Advertise Doesn't Advertise Lucky Bird Advertise 9, 9 15, 3 Doesn't Advertise 3, 15 11, 11 For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Full Coop advertises and Lucky Bird does not advertise, Full Coop will make a profit of $15 million, and Lucky Bird will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Lucky Bird and Full Coop are both profit-maximizing firms. If Lucky Bird chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of million if Full Coop does not advertise. If Lucky Bird chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of million if Full Coop does not advertise. If Full Coop advertises, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses . If Full Coop doesn't advertise, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses . Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? Both firms will choose to advertise. Lucky Bird will choose not to advertise and Full Coop will choose to advertise. Lucky Bird will choose to advertise and Full Coop will choose not to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise. Again, suppose that both firms start off not advertising. If the firms decide to collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? Lucky Bird will choose not to advertise and Full Coop will choose to advertise. Lucky Bird will choose to advertise and Full Coop will choose not to advertise. Both firms will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise.
Suppose that two firms, Lucky Bird and Full Coop, are the only sellers of seitan buffalo wings in some hypothetical market. The following payoff matrix gives the profit (in millions of dollars) earned by each company depending on whether or not it chooses to advertise: Full Coop Advertise Doesn't Advertise Lucky Bird Advertise 9, 9 15, 3 Doesn't Advertise 3, 15 11, 11 For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Full Coop advertises and Lucky Bird does not advertise, Full Coop will make a profit of $15 million, and Lucky Bird will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Lucky Bird and Full Coop are both profit-maximizing firms. If Lucky Bird chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of million if Full Coop does not advertise. If Lucky Bird chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of million if Full Coop does not advertise. If Full Coop advertises, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses . If Full Coop doesn't advertise, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses . Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? Both firms will choose to advertise. Lucky Bird will choose not to advertise and Full Coop will choose to advertise. Lucky Bird will choose to advertise and Full Coop will choose not to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise. Again, suppose that both firms start off not advertising. If the firms decide to collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? Lucky Bird will choose not to advertise and Full Coop will choose to advertise. Lucky Bird will choose to advertise and Full Coop will choose not to advertise. Both firms will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise.
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 3E
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Question
Suppose that two firms, Lucky Bird and Full Coop, are the only sellers of seitan buffalo wings in some hypothetical market. The following payoff matrix gives the profit (in millions of dollars) earned by each company depending on whether or not it chooses to advertise:
Full Coop | |||
Advertise | Doesn't Advertise | ||
Lucky Bird | Advertise | 9, 9 | 15, 3 |
Doesn't Advertise | 3, 15 | 11, 11 |
For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Full Coop advertises and Lucky Bird does not advertise, Full Coop will make a profit of $15 million, and Lucky Bird will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Lucky Bird and Full Coop are both profit-maximizing firms.
If Lucky Bird chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of
million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of
million if Full Coop does not advertise.
If Lucky Bird chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of
million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of
million if Full Coop does not advertise.
If Full Coop advertises, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses .
If Full Coop doesn't advertise, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses .
Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing?
Both firms will choose to advertise.
Lucky Bird will choose not to advertise and Full Coop will choose to advertise.
Lucky Bird will choose to advertise and Full Coop will choose not to advertise.
Both firms will choose not to advertise.
Again, suppose that both firms start off not advertising. If the firms decide to collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?
Lucky Bird will choose not to advertise and Full Coop will choose to advertise.
Lucky Bird will choose to advertise and Full Coop will choose not to advertise.
Both firms will choose to advertise.
Both firms will choose not to advertise.
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