Gozilla Inc. can generate 100 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Gozilla Inc., associated with emission reduction, is known MC=20+0.5Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Gozilla: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 40 units. Gozilla Inc. will clean up regulation is units of pollutant under the emission standard. The total control cost for Gozilla Inc. in this command-and-control Hint: Type integers.

Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal cost MCLA = (1/2)aL and older firms with dirtier MCHA = aH, where ai is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i = L, H. The social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry is MBA= 120 - A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that industry. Suppose that in order to avoid the costly obtention of disaggregate information about individual firms' costs, the government just implements a uniform standard aui  = A* / 2. Is this allocation efficient? If not, what is the deadweight loss?

Suppose that engineers have discovered a new production process for this product which results in a significant positive externality.  As a result of the positive externality, for every given output level Marginal Social Value (MSV1) is now higher than consumer’s marginal willingness to pay (also known as the Demand Curve shown as D0 below). Keep in mind that the setting is still that of a monopoly. 1) Please indicate on the graph above, assuming an absence of any government intervention to correct the positive externality and adding any necessary curve(s): The monopoly price P1 and the monopoly quantity Q1 under the condition of the (uncorrected) positive externality. (Also indicate, for comparison purposes, the original monopoly price P0 and monopoly quantity Q0.) The Socially Optimal output, QSO1. The resulting Consumer Surplus CS1, the resulting Producer Surplus PS1, and the size of Dead-Weight Loss DWL1 if there is such a loss. (No need to show the economic profits earned by the…

Suppose there are only two polluting firms, called A and B, with the following marginal abatement costs: 1602AA MACe=− and 100BB MACe=−, where A e represents firm A’s emissions in tons and B e represents firm B’s emissions in tons. Suppose the government wishes to ensure that the two firms together emit 60 tons of the pollutant and uses a Tradable Emission Permit (TEP) policy. Assume that each TEP allows its holder to emit 1 ton, and that the market for permits is perfectly competitive. a. Suppose the government initially distributes the total number of TEPs it issues  equally between the two firms. The permits are distributed free of charge. Once trade in permits takes place, what will be the equilibrium in the market for TEPs (i.e. which firm will buy how many TEPs from the other, and at what price)?  b. Briefly describe three problems of setting up a TEP market.

Gozilla Inc. can generate 100 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Gozilla Inc., associated with emission reduction, is known MC=20+0.5Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Gozilla: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 40 units. The level of reduction in the emission standard could be accomplished through an emission charge (quantity tax or penalty fee on emission). An emission charge of per emission unit would generate the target amount of reduction. Total (tax) revenue the regulator will collect as emission charges would be Hint: Type integers. Do not use thousands separators.

Suppose there are only two polluting firms, called A and B, with the following marginal abatement costs: MACA=160 2- e and MACB=100-es, where e represents firm A's emissions in tons and ea represents firm B's emissions in tons. Suppose the government wishes to ensure that the two firms together emit 60 tons of the pollutant and uses a Tradable Emission Permit (TEP) policy. Assume that each TEP allows its holder to emit 1 ton, and that the market for permits is perfectly competitive. a. Suppose the government initially distributes the total number of TEPs it issues equally between the two firms. The permits are distributed free of charge. Once trade in permits takes place, what will be the equilibrium in the market for TEPS (i.e. which firm will buy how many TEPs from the other, and at what price)? b. Briefly describe three problems of setting up a TEP market.

Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal cost MCLA = (1/2)aL and older firms with dirtier MCHA = aH, where ai is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i = L, H. The social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry is MBA= 120 - A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that industry. What Pigouvian tax t will implement the efficient allocation (aL, aH)? Is the resulting allocation an efficient allocation? What is the government's tax revenue?

By selling x tons of the first commodity the firm gets a price per ton given by Px=96-4x By selling y tons of the other commodity the price per ton is given by Py=84-2y The total cost of producing and selling x tons of the first commodity and y tons of the second is given by C(x,y)=2x2+2xy+y2 Suppose that the firm’s production activity causes so much pollution that the authorities limit its output to 11 tons in total. That is x + y = 11.   What is the optimal amount of y?

Appalachian Coal Mining believes that it can increase labor productivity and, therefore, net revenue by reducing air pollution in its mines. It estimates that the marginal cost function for reducing pollution by installing additional capital equipment is  MC = 40P where P represents a reduction of one unit of pollution in the mines. It also feels that for every unit of pollution reduction, the marginal increase in revenue (MR) is  MR = 1,000 - 10P How much pollution reduction should Appalachian Coal Mining undertake?

Firms within the country of Anviliania are currently emitting pollutants. These pollutants cause damages within Anviliania. However, the pollutants also cause damages to the properties and health of residents of countries that share borders with Anviliania. The Marginal Abatement Costs of the firms in Anviliania can be represented by the equation MAC(Anvil.) = 750 -2.3 e The Marginal Damage Costs to the residents of Anviliania are given by MDC (Anvil.) =- - 40 + 10 e The Marginal Damage Costs to all residents (including the residents of Anviliania) are MDC (Globe) = -20+ 12 e a. Draw a diagram representing this situation. b. Determine the magnitude of the local market failure and the global market failure. c. Suppose that the Anvilianian government has given production subsidies to the firms in Anviliania. As a result, the firms have increased production (and the number of firms have increased.). Consequently, the aggregate MAC is now MAC' (Anvil.) = 800 - 2.3 e. Determine the…