Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134492049
Author: Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, John List
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 9, Problem 5P
(a)
To determine
The maximum number of fishes caught collectively.
(b)
To determine
The number of fish collected by person J, if J knows that remaining 9 fishers are fishing lightly collectively.
(c)
To determine
The number of fish collected by person J, if J knows that remaining 9 fishers are fishing intensely collectively.
(d)
To determine
The condition in which one individual can be better off by fishing lightly on first day, if possible.
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Students have asked these similar questions
Two friends are deciding where to go for dinner. There are three choices, which we label A, B, and C.
Max prefers A to B to C. Sally prefers B to A to C.
To decide which restaurant to go to, the friends adopt the following procedure:
First, Max eliminates one of three choices.
Then, Sally decides among the two remaining choices.
Thus, Max has three strategies (eliminate A, eliminate B, and eliminate C). For each of those strategies, Sally has two choices (choose among the two remaining).
a.Write down the extensive form (game tree) to represent this game.
b.If Max acts non-strategically, and makes a decision in the first period to eliminate his least desirable choice, what will the final decision be?
c.What is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the above game?
d. Does your answer in b. differ from your answer in c.? Explain why or why not.
Only typed Answer
100 people are choosing between two beaches to go to in the Florida Keys. Beach L is big and never gets
crowded, but it is not very nice; the utility from going to Beach L is u(L) = 60. Beach M is much nicer but very
small, so it gets crowded; the utility from going to Beach M is u(M) = 100-NM ; NM is the number of people that
%3D
go to Beach M.
5) The Nash equilibrium number of people that go to Beach L is
A) 20
B) 40
C) 60
D) 80
E) 100
5).
Exercise 4.1 Amy and Bill simultaneously write a bid on a piece of paper. The bid
can only be either 2 or 3. A referee then looks at the bids, announces the amount of
the lowest bid (without revealing who submitted it) and invites Amy to either pass or
double her initial bid.
-
The outcome is determined by comparing Amy's final bid to Bill's bid: if one is
greater than the other then the higher bidder gets the object and pays his/her own bid;
if they are equal then Bill gets the object and pays his bid.
Represent this situation by means of two alternative extensive frames.
Note: (1) when there are simultaneous moves we have a choice as to which player we
select as moving first: the important thing is that the second player does not know what
the first player did;
(2) when representing, by means of information sets, what a player is uncertain about,
we typically assume that a player is smart enough to deduce relevant information, even
if that information is not explicitly given to…
Chapter 9 Solutions
Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
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