Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134492049
Author: Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, John List
Publisher: PEARSON
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 9, Problem 10P
(a)
To determine
Whether the fireworks display be offered or not.
(b)
To determine
Whether any individual will display on their own or not.
(c)
To determine
The number of people who will vote to display if each person is taxed at $20.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solution
Students have asked these similar questions
Two US states, New California and North Arizona, are negotiating over the distribution of water from a river. Assume the total amount of the river is 100, and each state wants as much as possible. The river starts in North Arizona, so they make an offer to New California about how to divide the river. New California can accept or reject the offer. They can also ask the federal government to decide the issue. Both states expect that the federal government would give New California 60% of the waters and North Arizona the remainder. However, the delay of asking the federal government to decide the issue would cost each state utility worth 5% of the river waters. Draw a bargaining game to represent this situation. Solve the game to find its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. How much water would each state get?
Suppose there are three people in society who vote on whether the government should undertake specific projects. Let the net benefits of a particular project be $150, $140, and $50 for persons A, B, and C, respectively.
a. If the project costs $300 and these costs are to be shared equally, would a majority vote to undertake the project? What would be the net benefits to each person under such a scheme? Would total net benefits be positive?
b. Suppose the project cost $375 and again costs were to be shared equally. Now would a majority vote for the project and total net benefits be positive?
c. Suppose (presumably contrary to fact) votes can be bought and sold in a free market. Describe what kinds of results you might expect in part a and part b.
An important question in economics is how to minimize the total cost of pollution reduction (called
the abatement cost, which is considered a "cost to society"). Two companies, Fim 1 and Firm 2,
each emit 10 units of pollution per year. The table below shows the total cost for each company to
reduce its pollution to a given value x. Due to technology differences, is more expensive for Fim
2 to reduce pollution than for Firm 1. When x = 10, no abatement has occurred (it is "business as
usual"); when x = 0, no pollution is emitted.
The table also shows an algebraic formula for each abatement cost. (BTW, it is a common
economic approximation that abatement cost goes up quadratically.)
Below, we solve this for two firms, but the method is applicable to a situation with multiple firms.
Per-firm pollution emissions x
Firm 1 total abatement cost = (10-x)
where x is the amount of pollution
Firm 2 total abatement cost = (20-2x)
where x is the amount of pollution
1.
3.
4.
9.
7.
8.
6.
10
100
81…
Chapter 9 Solutions
Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Please solve part d,e and f!!! Three roommates, Jim, Saleem, and Ritesh, are thinking about buying a new speaker system for their apartment. The speaker system would be a public good if they buy them, and the total cost would be $300 which would be shared equally among the three. Jim values it at $80, Saleem values it at $140, and Ritesh values it at $70. If the speakers are purchased each person gets a payoff equal to their net valuation (valuation minus cost share); if they are not purchased each gets zero payoff. a)Is it socially efficient that they buy the speaker system? With reference to the definition of a public good, why or why not? The roommates decide that they will write down their net valuations, and if these reports sum to more than zero, they will buy the TV (sharing the cost equally), or else they will not. b) If all were to report their true valuations, what payoff would each agent earn? c) Show that if Jim and Ritesh submit their true net valuation, then Saleem does…arrow_forwardDeborah and Janet are considering contributing toward the creation of a building mural. Each can choose whether to contribute $200 to the building mural or to keep that $200 for a new sult. Since a bullding mural is a public good, both Deborah and Janet will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.80 of benefit. For example, if both Deborah and Janet choose to contribute, then a total of $400 would be contributed to the building mural. So, Deborah and Janet would each receive $320 of benefit from the building mural, and their combined benefit would be $640. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a new suit is a private good, if Deborah chooses to spend $200 on a new suit, Deborah would get $200 of benefit from the new suit and Janet wouldn't recelve any benefit from Deborah's choice. If Deborah still spends $200 on a new suit and Janet chooses to contribute…arrow_forwardplease answer all including ones that may have already been selected. Eric and Kenji are considering contributing toward the creation of a public park. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the public park or to keep that $300 for a cell phone. Since a public park is a public good, both Eric and Kenji will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.90 of benefit. For example, if both Eric and Kenji choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the public park. So, Eric and Kenji would each receive $540 of benefit from the public park, and their combined benefit would be $1,080. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a cell phone is a private good, if Eric chooses to spend $300 on a cell phone, Eric would get $300 of benefit from the cell phone and Kenji wouldn't receive any benefit from Eric's choice. If Eric still spends $300…arrow_forward
- Beth and Eleanor are considering contributing toward the creation of a building mural. Each can choose whether to contribute $400 to the building mural or to keep that $400 for a weekend getaway. Since a building mural is a public good, both Beth and Eleanor will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.60 of benefit. For example, if both Beth and Eleanor choose to contribute, then a total of $800 would be contributed to the building mural. So, Beth and Eleanor would each receive $480 of benefit from the building mural, and their combined benefit would be $960. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a weekend getaway is a private good, if Beth chooses to spend $400 on a weekend getaway, Beth would get $400 of benefit from the weekend getaway and Eleanor wouldn't receive any benefit from Beth's choice. If Beth still spends $400 on a weekend getaway and…arrow_forwardKenji and Paolo are considering contributing toward the creation of a building mural. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the building mural or to keep that $300 for a new suit. Since a building mural is a public good, both Kenji and Paolo will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.70 of benefit. For example, if both Kenji and Paolo choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the building mural. So, Kenji and Paolo would each receive $420 of benefit from the building mural, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a new suit is a private good, if Kenji chooses to spend $300 on a new suit, Kenji would get $300 of benefit from the new suit and Paolo wouldn't receive any benefit from Kenji's choice. If Kenji still spends $300 on a new suit and Paolo chooses to contribute $300 to the…arrow_forwardConsider the following decision by two countries: a small country (C1) and a large country (C2). When both countries cooprate and agree to an environmental agreement, C1 receives 4 and C2 receives 5 units of benefit. When they do not cooperae, they incur costs of -1, and -2, respectively. The payoffs associated with other outcomes are described in the table below. Large country (C2) Agree to environmental protection (cooperate) Do not agree to environmental protection (do not cooperate) The Socially Optiomal outcome is The Nash Equilibrium is Agree to environmental protection (cooperate) C1:4 C2: 5 C1: 2 C2: 6 [Choose ] Small country (C1) [Choose ] Do not agree to environmental protection (do not cooperate) C1:2 C2: -3 C1: -1 C2: -2arrow_forward
- assume that there are 1000 residents of a town, each of whose marginal benefit (willingness to pay) for having x miles of roads is P = 100 - 5x. Roads are built competitively at a marginal cost of MC = 2000 per mile. Roads are a public good. What is the efficient level of roadway construction? It is closest to? If residents decide on road building independently, how many miles of roadway will be built? It is closest to:arrow_forwardMarkets do not handle externalities well. With a ____________________ externality, the market produces too much of a good; whereas with a ________________________ externality, the market produces too little of a good. In both cases, if the market creates ________________ _______________, meaning the market is not efficient because it is not fully capturing the ____________ __________ of positive externalities nor the __________________ ___________ of negative externalities.arrow_forwardThe population of Outbacktown is 1,000 people. Each of them has a marginal benefit curve for fireworks given by MB = 10 – 2Q dollars, where Q is the number of minutes of the fireworks display. The marginal cost is constant, each extra minute costs 5,000 dollars; thus MC = 5,000. Outbacktown is sparsely populated, and the terrain is very flat, so it is fairly safe to assume that fireworks over there are both nonrival and nonexcludable. (a) Obtain the optimal number of minutes that the show should last. What is the Lindahl price for each individual? (b) Now suppose that the usual provider is unavailable to offer the firework display this year and the major has to go with a new provider, Mr. Smoke. Fortunately, Mr. Smoke's marginal cost is the same as the usual provider. However, the environmental quality of Mr. Smoke's display is not that great; it generates a negative externality in the health of the population that has been estimated to be 2 dollars per each minute of the show, and for…arrow_forward
- The figure to the right shows the marginal cost of pollution abatement for two firms, A and B. The firms were initially abating 46 units of pollution each. Now they can trade pollution permits at a price of $22. As a result, firm A sells permits and firm B buys permits. Both firms are now better off and their total saving will be $ (Enter your answer rounded to the nearest whole number.) Dollars per Unit ($) 34 22 10 The Efficiency of Tradable Pollution Permits MCB 31 46 61 Quantity of Pollution Abatement MCA Narrow_forwardAdam and Catherine are choosing between two ice cream shops, Icy and Frosty, located at either end of a 1-mile-long beach. Adam is standing in front of Icy, while Catherine is standing in front of Frosty. Both Adam and Catherine are each willing to pay, at most, $6 for one ice cream cone. It costs them $1 to walk the 1-mile distance between the shops. Icy is government- run, so the price is fixed at exactly $4/cone and will not change. The shops face costs of $o.25/cone. What price should Frosty charge if it is to maximize its total profits from Adam and Catherine?arrow_forwardDmitri and Jake are considering contributing toward the creation of a water fountain. Each can choose whether to contribute $300 to the water fountain or to keep that $300 for a pool table. Since a water fountain is a public good, both Dmitri and Jake will benefit from any contributions made by the other person. Specifically, every dollar that either one of them contributes will bring each of them $0.70 of benefit. For example, if both Dmitri and Jake choose to contribute, then a total of $600 would be contributed to the water fountain. So, Dmitri and Jake would each receive $420 of benefit from the water fountain, and their combined benefit would be $840. This is shown in the upper left cell of the first table. Since a pool table is a private good, if Dmitri chooses to spend $300 on a pool table, Dmitri would get $300 of benefit from the pool table and Jake wouldn't receive any benefit from Dmitri's choice. If Dmitri still spends $300 on a pool table and Jake chooses to contribute…arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134078779Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. OsterPublisher:PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134870069Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick KoellingPublisher:PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781305585126Author:N. Gregory MankiwPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...EconomicsISBN:9781259290619Author:Michael Baye, Jeff PrincePublisher:McGraw-Hill Education
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:9780134078779
Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:9780134870069
Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:9781305585126
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...
Economics
ISBN:9781259290619
Author:Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:McGraw-Hill Education