Health Economics
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781137029966
Author: Jay Bhattacharya
Publisher: SPRINGER NATURE CUSTOMER SERVICE
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Chapter 7, Problem 3E
To determine
Determine whether the given statement is true or false.
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Indicate whether the statement is true or false, and justify your answer.Risk-averse consumers always prefer insurance that is actuarially fair but not full to full insurance that is actuarially unfair – but the opposite is true for risk-loving consumers.
insurance is pure liability coverage over and above the coverage provided by other types of policies.
The difference between the actuarily fair price for insurance and the price a risk-averse individual is willing to pay to fully insure is called
a-insurance benefit
b-risk aversion
c-the risk premium
d-risk profit
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