Subgames • At each node where a player makes a decision, we can think about the "subgame" starting at that node • A subgame is the portion of the tree following a particular node • • • How many subgames does our first sequential move example have? How many subgames does our entry game have? How many subgames does the game on the right have? • What are its Nash equilibria? Player 1 (1,4) T Player 2 U B (5,2) (3,3) P Player 1 D L 9 (2,0) Player 2 R (6,2)

Subgames • At each node where a player makes a decision, we can think about the "subgame" starting at that node • A subgame is the portion of the tree following a particular node • • • How many subgames does our first sequential move example have? How many subgames does our entry game have? How many subgames does the game on the right have? • What are its Nash equilibria? Player 1 (1,4) T Player 2 U B (5,2) (3,3) P Player 1 D L 9 (2,0) Player 2 R (6,2)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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