Consider a two player game with Fred and Barney, who tal turns removing matchsticks from a pile. They start with 33 matchsticks, and Fred goes first. On each tum, each player may remove either one, two, three, four, or five matchsticks. The player to remove the last matchstick wins the game. What are the optimal strategies for each player? Who will win? b. Suppose now that they can remove up to six matchsticks, how will the optimal strategies change for- each player? a.

Use the following game table to answer the question: Player 2 Y 6, 3 1, 3 A 10, 5 0,0 Player 1 B 2,6 0,0 3,5 3, 4 3, 3 Is the Nash equilibrium of this game for Player 1 to choose A and Player 2 to choose X? Why or why not? O It is; if Player 2 chose B or C they would get less than 10, and if Player 1 chose Y or Z they would get less than 5. It is not; Player 2 could get 6, instead of 5, if they chose B. O It is; if Player 1 chose B or C they would get less than 10, and if Player 2 chose Y or Z they would get less than 5. It is; if Player 2 chose B or C they would get less than 5, and if Player 1 chose Y or Z they would get less than 10. It is not; Player 1 could get 6, instead of 5, if they chose B.

Which of the following is NOT an example of a coordination game? O deciding whether to grow tomatoes or flowers coordination with customers O deciding whether to use the same technology as others you are connected to interpersonal relationships

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Consider the following simultaneous games. List all pure equilibrium.

John and Jane usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections.                   A. Diagram a game in which John and Jane choose whether to vote or not to vote.                 B. Suppose John and Jane is in agreement not to vote during the election.                             1.) Would such an agreement improve utility? Justify your answer.                             2.) Would such an agreement be an equilibrium? Justify your answer.

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