PRICE (S) 10 D2 DI OD LED 1. OD ₂ED 2 D₁ED 2. OD 2ED 1¹ E 2000 QUANTITY DI D2 Marigold Residence is an oligopoly. Marigold's rivals will not match price increases but will match price decreases. Consequently, the firm's demand curve will be (from left to right)

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Rainbow Wer-Odeon Bargaining Game Rainbow Reeder Rep S O St O O PH M Rainbow Writer (RW) is a small online company selling a highly rated software package for printing color labels directly onto CDs. The firm currently earns a profit of $2 million per year selling its package exclusively on its Web site. Odeon, the producer of the most popular software package for editing and burning CDs and DVDs has expressed interest in bundling Rainbow Writer's product into its own package. Odeon expects that bundling would further boost its sales and allow it to sell the new bundled product at a higher price, thus raising its profits beyond its current profit of $12 million. Figure 5 shows the decision tree for the Rainbow Writer-Odeon bargaining game. Refer to Figure 5. How will Rainbow Writer respond to Odeon's two possible offers? O Rainbow Writer will only accept an offer of $40 per copy of the software package. O Rainbow Writer will only accept an offer of $30 per copy of the software package.…

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Suppose that in the market for cell phone service the number of competitors has dwindled until D & C Romer Net and Spa T. Wireless have become the only providers left in the nation. Seeking to boost their profits, the two companies secretly agree to a coordinated increase in their prices for cell phone minutes. This practice is known as a Nash equilibrium. O tying. collusion. antitrust. predatory pricing.

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Consider two Cournot oligopolists, firm 1 and firm 2, in a homogenous product market. The market demand is P = 100 - 3Q and each firm has a constant marginal cost MC=10. The market price of equilibrium and total quantity in the market is: Select one: O a. P* 30 and Q* = 20 O b. P* 40 and Q* = 20 ○ C. P* 40 and Q* = 30 d. P20 and Q* = 30

5. Duopolist firms 1 and 2 compete on price with some market differentiation. Demand for firm ie{1, 2} is q, = 2 – 2p, + p, Neither firm has costs. a. Find the best response functions for each firm in the static game. b. Find the unique Nash equilibrium prices in the static game. c. Are prices strategic complements or strategic substitutes? Briefly explain. d. Does Firm 1 want Firm 2 to increase or decrease p,?

Firm x is and oligopoly market. Market demand is inelastic, so this firm can increase profit by rasing prices. However, if it does so, it might lose sales to its competitors. How can this frim use price signaling to increase its profits?

3. Demand for a good produced by a duopoly is given by P = 100 - Q. Both firms have constant marginal costs, MC = 20 and zero fixed costs. Firms can choose to maximize profit or revenue. Suppose firm 1 choose to maximise profit and firm 2 choose to maximise revenue. Determine the equilibrium price and quantity of each firm.