1. What is the Nash equilibrium in the price competition homogeneous-product oligopoly? 2. Why do the firms charge the same price in equilibrium?

5. Duopolist firms 1 and 2 compete on price with some market differentiation. Demand for firm ie{1, 2} is q, = 2 – 2p, + p, Neither firm has costs. a. Find the best response functions for each firm in the static game. b. Find the unique Nash equilibrium prices in the static game. c. Are prices strategic complements or strategic substitutes? Briefly explain. d. Does Firm 1 want Firm 2 to increase or decrease p,?

How are the implications of the kinked demand curve in an oligopoly market best illustrsted and explained

I need help with econ multiple hw questions asap! 93) As the number of firms change in an oligopoly market, what will it become?  A. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a monopoly market equilibrium  B. As the number of firms increases, the market approaches a competitive market equilibrium  C. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a socially optimal equilibrium.  D. As the number of firms decreases, the market approaches a cartel equilibrium. 92) Refer to the attached Table 40. If both stores follow a dominant strategy, what will SuperDuper Saver's growth-related profits be?  A. $25  B. $250  C. $85  D. $50

*You only need to answer question D*

Coke and Pepsi dominate the cola market. Suppose that the marginal cost of making cola is $2. Assume also that the demand for cola is given by the following table: Price $8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Quantity 5 cans 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Suppose Coke and Pepsi both supply cola. They form a cartel and agree to cooperate on how much soda to produce. In this cartel case, how many bottles of cola would be sold? Type your answer...

8. Two firms, the only firms in the market, sell the same product and have the same marginal cost. They realise they would be better off if they didn't compete with each other. They enter an alternating offers bargaining game to decide how they will divide the monopoly profit, n. They have three periods to come to an agreement. If no agreement is reached after three periods, the firms will compete simultaneously in prices. The firms toss a coin to decide who makes the first offer in the bargaining game. Firm 1 wins and decides to go first. Each firm has a discount factor o. a) Draw the game tree. b) What is the subgame perfect equilibrium when 8 = 0.5? c) What is the equilibrium payoff for each firm? d) Was Firm 1 wise to opt to make the first offer? Explain your answer. %3D

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Discuss how oligopoly market structure can help explain some of the decision-making processes by firms?