ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN: 9780190931919
Author: NEWNAN
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Two firms A and B produce a product jointly. The total value to the two firms from the joint venture is given by V = √iA + √iB where iA and iB are the firms’ respective investment levels. After the investment levels have been chosen, the firms divide V equally.
a) Find the Nash equilibrium investment levels, and the payoffs for each firm.
b) Suppose that A and B merge. Find the optimal investment levels and the payoffs for the merged firm. Do the firms benefit from the merger? Why?
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