Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 6 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 6 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 3 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward.   Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: -3, Mrs. Ward: -3 Mr. Ward: 3, Mrs. Ward: -6 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -6, Mrs. Ward: 3 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0   The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to    and for Mrs. Ward to    . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of   units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of   units of utility.   Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. True   False     This agreement not to vote    a Nash equilibrium.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter15: Strategic Games
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Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 6 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 6 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 3 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward.
  Mrs. Ward
Vote Don't Vote
Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: -3, Mrs. Ward: -3 Mr. Ward: 3, Mrs. Ward: -6
Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -6, Mrs. Ward: 3 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0
 
The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to    and for Mrs. Ward to    . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of
 
units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of
 
units of utility.
 
Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election.
True or False: This agreement would decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question.
True
 
False
 
 
This agreement not to vote    a Nash equilibrium.
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