How would the Coumot equilibrium change in the airline example if American's marginal cost were $100 and United's were $2007 The demand the duopoly quantity-setting firms face is Q-339-p with an inverse demand function of p330 - 19A- 19U- where ga is the quantity produced by American and qu is the quantity produced by United. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where qa equalsand qu equals (enter numeric responses using integers)

.        OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was founded in 1969.  Their original objective was to form a cartel to increase the price that they receive for their oil exports.     Create a prisoner’s dilemma type game for two large members of OPEC (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia).  Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of these two countries.  Verbally explain how you got your numbers. Find the Nash equilibrium.  Based on this model, what strategy is in the oil exporters’ best interest (Nash or otherwise)?  How do they make it happen?  Create another prisoner’s dilemmamodel for all of OPEC on one side, and all non OPEC oil exporting nations on the other side.  Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of the two sides.  Verbally explain how you created your numbers.   Also create your numbers applying the fact that OPEC’s total production capacity is greater than total non OPEC exports…

Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $20 per unit. Firm 1 faces a 110-2p1 + P2, where q1 is Firm 1's output, p1 is Firm 1's price, and p2 is Firm 2's price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is 92 110-2p2 + p1. What is Firm 1's profit demand function of 9₁ under the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, assuming no fixed costs? = =

Suppose that identical duopoly firms have constant marginal costs of $0 per unit. Firm 1 faces ademand function of q1 = 100 – 2p1 + p2, where q1 is Firm 1’s output, p1 is Firm 1’s price, and p2 isFirm 2’s price. Similarly, the demand Firm 2 faces is q2 = 100 – 2p2 + p1. Please solve for theBertrand equilibrium.

Space 1 options: less than or equal to, equal to, greater than or equal to   Space 2 options: 0 0.5 1 8 16

Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, C(q) - 40g Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by P= 190 -Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot compedtor. Calculate the Coumot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes as profes when taking its rival's output as given. What are the profits of each firm? (Round all quantities and dollar amounts to two decimal places) When competing, each firm will produce units of output. In tum, each firm will earn profit of $. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of $10 and American had corntant marginal and average costs of S407 It Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of $10 and American had constant marginal and average costs of S40, American would produceunits and Texas Air Corp. would produce units. In…

Consider a Cournot duopoly. The inverse demand function of the market is given by p = 10-Q, where p is the market price, and Q = 91 +92 is the aggregate output. The marginal costs of the two firms are C₁ 1 and C₂ = 4. = (a) Solve for the Nash equilibrium of the game including firm out- puts, market price, aggregate output, and firm profits. (b) Now suppose these two firms play a 2-stage game. In stage 1, they produce capacities 9₁ and 92, which are equal to the Nash equilibrium quantities of the Cournot game characterised by part (a). In stage 2, they simultaneously decide on their prices p₁ and P2. The marginal cost for each firm to sell up to capacity is 0. It is impossible to sell more than capacity. The residual demand for 10 Piāj if Pi > Pj firm ij, is Di (Pi, Pj) = 10-Pi 2 = if pipi. (Note, if Pi < Pj 10 - Pi here we assume that the efficient/parallel rationing applies). Prove that it is a Nash equilibrium of the second stage subgame that each firm charges the market clearing…

9.17

Please help with these two: 1. Consider a Duopoly model, in which two firms decide a quantity simultaneously. If they collude (setting the total quantity together), then each firm can earn (higher, or lower) profit than in the Cournot equilibrium. 2. Consider a collusion with two firms. The joint profit is maximized by setting quantity and price together. Each firm sells the agreed amount. However, believing that the other firm sells the agreed amount, there is always a temptation for the firm sell (more, or less) than the agreed amount.

QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)