Hello help please There are six hundred Economics students in the post-graduate classes of a university, and the probability for any student to need a copy of a particular book from the university library on any day is 0.05. How many copies of the book should be kept in the university library so that the probability may be greater than 0.90 that none of the students needing a copy from the library has to come back disappointed?

Solve on paper ( economics)

Consider a worker who works for at most two periods (say, when young and when old) at a particular firm. Each period, the worker can choose between exerting high effort and exerting low effort. The worker's cost of exerting high effort are Cy when young and Co when old. The worker's cost of exerting low effort are zero. The effort of the worker is difficult to observe by the firm. With probability T, the firm observes the worker's effort at the end of a period. With the remaining probability, the firm does not observe the worker's effort. The firm can only fire the worker when it observed that the worker has shirked. In that case, the firm is also allowed to withhold the worker's wage for the period in which the worker was caught shirking. When exerting high effort, the worker's productivity is q, when young and q, when old. When exerting low effort, the worker's productivity is zero. The worker's value of alternative job opportunities is when young and v, when old. For simplicity, the…

To go from Location 1 to Location 2, you can either take a car or take transit. Your utility function is: U= -1Xminutes -5Xdollars +0.13Xcar (i.e. 0.13 is the car constant) Car= 15 minutes and $8 Transit= 40 minutes and $4 What is your probability of taking transit given the conditions above? What is your probability of taking transit if the number of buses on the route were doubled, meaning the headways are halved? Remember to include units.

Consider the following interaction between a student and a company. The student is either serious or lazy with probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 respectively. The student knows if they are serious or not, but the company does not. Initially, the student decides whether to revise for exams or not. Revising has a cost of 1 for a serious student and 3 for a lazy one. The company observes the student's exam result (that is, whether they have made the effort to revise), and based on this, offers a salary of 3 (for a serious student) or 1 (for a lazy student). The student learns of the proposed salary and can then either accept (and earn the salary) or refuse (and earn O). They also lose the revision effort if they worked. The company's gain is equal to the student's productivity (4 if they are serious, 2 if not) minus the salary if the student accepts the offer, and O otherwise. 1. Represent the game in extensive form. 2. Show that the game has a unique perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, and provide the…

Industry standards suggest that 12 percent of new vehicles require warranty service within the first year. University Toyota in Morgantown, WV sold 10 Toyotas yesterday. What is the probability that exactly one of these vehicles will require warranty service?