son is trying to sell cars. The number of cars that she will sell depends on her eno "e" and her luck. Given her effort e, with probability 4e she is able to sell four cars, and with probability (1-4e she is able to sell only one car. Her personal cost of effort is 100e². The dealership pays her a bonus b for each car sold. The salesperson is risk-neutral, and wants to maximize her expected utility, which is her expected income minus her effort cost. a) Given the bonus b, the salesperson's best response function is b) Suppose the dealership pays b = 2. Then the expected number of cars sold will be E(Q)=

son is trying to sell cars. The number of cars that she will sell depends on her eno "e" and her luck. Given her effort e, with probability 4e she is able to sell four cars, and with probability (1-4e she is able to sell only one car. Her personal cost of effort is 100e². The dealership pays her a bonus b for each car sold. The salesperson is risk-neutral, and wants to maximize her expected utility, which is her expected income minus her effort cost. a) Given the bonus b, the salesperson's best response function is b) Suppose the dealership pays b = 2. Then the expected number of cars sold will be E(Q)=

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

3
Please ans E
bottom is the question, top is a part to the solution one of he chegg tutors wrote down. In WHAT WORLD does 100/1000=0.01 IT DOESN'T. 100/1000 = 0.1 to the power of -2 is 100 NOT 1000 so CAN SOMEONE PLEASE PLEASE correctly solve this. This is my third time posting it like jesssusssss
please answer within 30 minutes.
Asap
Y5 Alfred is a risk-averse person with $100 in monetary wealth and owns a house worth $300, for total wealth of $400. The probability that his house is destroyed by fire (equivalent to a loss of $300) is pne = 0.5. If he exerts an effort level e = 0.3 to keep his house safe, the probability falls to pe = 0.2. His utility function is: U = w0.5 – e where e is effort level exerted (zero in the case of no effort and 0.3 in the case of effort).a. In the absence of insurance, does Alfred exert effort to lower the probability of fire?HINT: Calculate and compare the expected utility i) with effort, and ii) without effort. If effort is exerted, then the effort cost is paid regardless of whether or not a fire occurs.b. Alfred is considering buying fire insurance. The insurance agent explains that a home owner’s insurance policy would require paying a premium α and would repay the value of the house in the event of fire, minus a deductible “D”. [A deductible is an amount of money that the…
If probability of the student attend the first lecture is 0.55, the probability that he attend the second lecture is 0.40, and the probability he attend both is 0.28. Find probability that he not attend first lecture or not attend the second one: O.72 O.36 O.95 O.27
Becky is deciding whether to purchase an insurance for her home againtst burglary. the payoff for her is shown as follow: Net worth of her Net worth of her home: $ 20000 burglary(10%) Net worth of her Net worth of her home: $50000 burglary (90%) The insueance would cover all the loss from burlary and the insurance fee is $8000. Her utility funtion is given as u=w ^0.3 Should Beck purchase the insurance Explain.
please only do: if you can teach explain each part
2. Christiaan can go hiking, or he can stay at home. Hiking would be fun if nothing bad happens, but there is a risk if he goes hiking that he will meet a bear (not fun) or get bitten by a snake (very not fun). Christiaan decides that if there is a 5% chance of meeting a bear and a 1% chance of getting bitten by a snake, he would prefer to go hiking rather than stay at home. However, if the chance of meeting a bear is 10% and the chance of a snake bite is 5%, he definitely would rather stay at home. then (a) Consider the utility function: U (stay home) = 25, U (hike no event) = 100, U (hike & snake) -1000, U (hike & bear) = -200. Does this utility function represent Christiaan's pref- erences? Explain. (b) Suppose that the utility function in (a) does represent Christiaan's preferences. Would Christiaan prefer to hike or stay home if the probability of meeting a bear is 6% and the probability of being bitten by a snake is 4%? Show your work.
c and d please!!
Consider a worker who works for at most two periods (say, when young and when old) at a particular firm. Each period, the worker can choose between exerting high effort and exerting low effort. The worker's cost of exerting high effort are Cy when young and Co when old. The worker's cost of exerting low effort are zero. The effort of the worker is difficult to observe by the firm. With probability T, the firm observes the worker's effort at the end of a period. With the remaining probability, the firm does not observe the worker's effort. The firm can only fire the worker when it observed that the worker has shirked. In that case, the firm is also allowed to withhold the worker's wage for the period in which the worker was caught shirking. When exerting high effort, the worker's productivity is q, when young and q, when old. When exerting low effort, the worker's productivity is zero. The worker's value of alternative job opportunities is when young and v, when old. For simplicity, the…