1. Consider a market for water with two firms. We assume two firms can produce the good without any cost (TC = 0). The market demand schedule is given as: Quantity (gallon) Price ($) 30 90 40 80 50 70 60 60 70 50 80 40 90 30 100 20 110 10 Cartel: Assume that two firms are colluding, so both firms agree upon a contract that they produce the
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- Question 3 Assume we have a market with only two companies in it, Company X and Company Y. Now suppose that both companies have to choose one of two potential strategies for pricing their products: setting a low price or setting a high price. The table below shows the expected profits for each company under each pricing scenario. Assume both companies are in competition with each other and seek to maximize their profits. Under these conditions, how much profit should we expect both companies to earn? Company Y Provide your answer below: High Price Low Price High Price Profit for Company Y: $12, 975,000 Profit for Company X: $12, 975,000 Profit for Company Y: $16, 218,000 Profit for Company X: $1,946, 000 Company X Low Price Profit for Company Y: $1,946, 000 Profit for Company X: $16, 218,000 Profit for Company Y: $6,487,000 Profit for Company X: $6,487,000Coke and Pepsi dominate the cola market. Suppose that the marginal cost of making cola is $2. Assume also that the demand for cola is given by the following table: Price $8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Quantity 5 cans 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Suppose Coke and Pepsi both supply cola. They form a cartel and agree to cooperate on how much soda to produce. In this cartel case, how many bottles of cola would be sold? Type your answer...Question 2 Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb=268-10Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1= 6Q The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2=4Q (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $102 and firm 2 had a fixed cost of $104 What are the profits of firm 2? (hint 567.26) How much consumer surplus is created by industry transactions? (hint 1333.34) Full explain this question and text typing work only We should answer our question within 2 hours takes more time then we will reduce Rating Dont ignore this line ...
- QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)Stargell and Schmidt are brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Stargell and Schmidt form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Stargell and Schmidt choose to work together. PRICE (Dollars per can) 200 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 MC-ATC MR 0 0 90 180 270 360 450 540 830 720 810 900 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) + Monopoly Outcome When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce 80 cans and charge $1.20 per can. Given this information, each…Now suppose United Air Lines enters the Atlanta market. Consider this to be an oligopoly market with two firms that behave in a Cournot Model fashion. The market demand schedule is cost schedule for both firms are: P = 400 - .5*Q, and firm level cost for both firms is MC=AC=Scomp=100. What is the Cournot Market Price? Fill in the blank below with your answer. Your answer should be entered as a whole number such as 102. If you get 102.56, do not round or enter any decimal places, just enter 102 and nothing else for the answer.
- Please no written by hand solution Suppose two firms compete in quantities (Cournot). Market demand is given by P = 260 − 2Q, where Q = q1 + q2. Both firms have constant MC = AT C = 20.a. Solve for the Cournot equilibrium and find the Cournot equilibrium profits for each firm.b. Now suppose the two firms formed a cartel. What would be the profits for each firm then?c. If firm 2 sticks to the cartel agreement (quantity), then what is the best response for firm 1 (if firm 1 were to deviate)? Find the profits for firm 1 from deviating.d. How large must the probability-adjusted discount factor be in order for the cartel to be stable?e. How would the answer to part d. change if the two firms were competing in prices (Bertrand)?Please answer all steps, because no too much detailed answers required.Assume that the market for oil is made up of two firms: Exxon Mobil and Chevron. Also assume that New England has dozens of breweries and each of these make beers with different tastes, colors, and aromas. Which of the following statements is true? The market structure for oil is an oligopoly, and the one for beer is monopolistic competition. The market structure for oil is monopolistic competition, and the one for beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is monopolistic competition.If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival’s output as given (i.e., the firmsbehave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm?What is the total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm?
- please assist with f and h. Two dairy farmers produce milk for a local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P(P denotes price measured in Rands, Q denotes the quantity measured in liters). Both farmers have the same cost function given by TC=150+2q (where q denotes output). (f) Calculate the profits if farmer 2 decides to break the cartel agreement (g) Does joining a cartel offer any benefits to both farmers? Justify your answer (h) What if farmer 1 is a leader and farmer 2 a follower, determine the price, quantity andprofits made by these two farmersMays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.40 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce 20 cans and charge $----- per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of $------ so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $------------ . Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce…A Cournot Oligopoly (duopoly) exists where the market demand function facing each of the two firms is P = 4 - (Q1 + Q2) , where Q = (Q1 + Q2) and the MC facing each firm is zero. If the two firms form a cartel, what is the market quantity (Q) and market price (P) that will prevail?