EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
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Chapter 17.3, Problem 1.3MQ
To determine
Probability to choose C rather than E .
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With what probability does player 1 play Down in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium? (Input your
answer as a decimal to the nearest hundredth, for example: 0.14, 0.56, or 0.87).
PLAYER 1
Up
Down
PLAYER 2
Left
97,95
47, 33
Right
8,43
68,91
In a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game below, what is the probability with which Player 2 chooses r (if
there are multiple equilibria with different probabilities of a, choose any one)?
Player 2
y
a
3, 3
4, 2
Player 1
b
6,3
2, 6
5. 3
3, 2
Numerical answer
Imagine that a zealous prosecutor (P) has accused a defendant (D) of committing a crime. Suppose that the trial involves evidence production by bothparties and that by producing evidence, a litigant increases the probabilityof winning the trial. Specifically, suppose that the probability that the defendant wins is given by eD>(eD + eP), where eD is the expenditure on evidenceproduction by the defendant and eP is the expenditure on evidence production by the prosecutor. Assume that eD and eP are greater than or equal to0. The defendant must pay 8 if he is found guilty, whereas he pays 0 if heis found innocent. The prosecutor receives 8 if she wins and 0 if she losesthe case.
(a) Represent this game in normal form.(b) Write the first-order condition and derive the best-response function foreach player.(c) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. What is the probability that thedefendant wins in equilibrium.(d) Is this outcome efficient? Why?
Chapter 17 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 17.3 - Prob. 1MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 2MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1.2MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 2.2MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1.3MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1TTACh. 17.3 - Prob. 2TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 1TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 2TTA
Ch. 17.4 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 2.1TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 1MQCh. 17.4 - Prob. 1.2TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 2.2TTACh. 17.5 - Prob. 1MQCh. 17.5 - Prob. 2MQCh. 17.6 - Prob. 1TTACh. 17.6 - Prob. 2TTACh. 17 - Prob. 1RQCh. 17 - Prob. 2RQCh. 17 - Prob. 3RQCh. 17 - Prob. 4RQCh. 17 - Prob. 5RQCh. 17 - Prob. 6RQCh. 17 - Prob. 7RQCh. 17 - Prob. 8RQCh. 17 - Prob. 9RQCh. 17 - Prob. 10RQCh. 17 - Prob. 17.1PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.2PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.3PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.4PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.5PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.6PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.7PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.8PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.9PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.10P
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