EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 17, Problem 17.5P
a.
To determine
To describe: the sub-game perfect equilibrium, if the players care only about the monetary payoffs.
B
To determine
To describe: The extensive form reflecting the new pay offs and sub-game perfect equilibrium.
c.
To determine
To describe: The extensive form reflecting the new pay offs and sub-game perfect equilibrium, if the players are perfectly altruistic.
d.
To determine
To describe: The extensive form reflecting the new pay offs and sub-game perfect equilibrium, if the players are perfectly selfless.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solutionStudents have asked these similar questions
Two players play the Ultimatum Game, in which they are to split $20. A purely rational agent would only reject an offer of …
Group of answer choices...
-$20
-$19
-$1
-$0
-$10
Assume that a proposer and a respondent are playing an ultimatum game where they split a pie of Rs. 100. What is the
backward induction equilibrium of this game? In a laboratory experiment we see that offers from the proposer averaging
Rs. 20 are routinely rejected by the respondent. Name one theory that has been used to offer an explanation for this
observation. Using that theory what modifications of agent utility functions are needed for such outcomes as described
above to be equilibrium?
Consider the following scenarios in the Ultimatum game, viewed from the perspective of the Recipient. Assume that the Recipient is motivated by negative reciprocity and will gain $15 of
value from rejecting an offer that is strictly less than 50 percent of the total amount to be divided between the two players by the Proposer. Assume that the Proposer can only make offers
in increments of $1.
If the pot is $30, what is the minimum offer that the Responder will accept? What percent of the pie is this amount?
The minimum offer that will be accepted is S. which represents percent of the pie.
If the pot is $100, what is the minimum offer that the Responder will accept? What percent of the pie is this amount?
The minimum offer that will be accepted is S, which represents percent of the pie. (Round answers to 2 decimal places as needed)
Chapter 17 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 17.3 - Prob. 1MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 2MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1.2MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 2.2MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1.3MQCh. 17.3 - Prob. 1TTACh. 17.3 - Prob. 2TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 1TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 2TTA
Ch. 17.4 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 2.1TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 1MQCh. 17.4 - Prob. 1.2TTACh. 17.4 - Prob. 2.2TTACh. 17.5 - Prob. 1MQCh. 17.5 - Prob. 2MQCh. 17.6 - Prob. 1TTACh. 17.6 - Prob. 2TTACh. 17 - Prob. 1RQCh. 17 - Prob. 2RQCh. 17 - Prob. 3RQCh. 17 - Prob. 4RQCh. 17 - Prob. 5RQCh. 17 - Prob. 6RQCh. 17 - Prob. 7RQCh. 17 - Prob. 8RQCh. 17 - Prob. 9RQCh. 17 - Prob. 10RQCh. 17 - Prob. 17.1PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.2PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.3PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.4PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.5PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.6PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.7PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.8PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.9PCh. 17 - Prob. 17.10P
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Consider the following game: you and a partner on a school project are asked to evaluate the other, privately rating them either "1 (Good)" or "0 (Bad)". After all the ratings have been done, a bonus pot of $1000 is given to the person with the highest number of points. If there is a tie, the pool is split evenly. Both players only get utility from money. Mark all of the following true statements: A. The best response to your partner rating you as Good is to rate them as Good as well. Your answer B. There is no best response in this game. C. Your partner's best response to you rating them as Bad is to also rate you as C Bad. D. Your best response to any strategy of your partner is to play "Good".arrow_forwardTwo players play the Ultimatum Game, in which they are to split $20. A purely rational agent would only reject an offer of …arrow_forwardSuppose that the proposer in the ultimatum game may not propose fractional amounts, and therefore must propose $0, $1, $2, ..., or $10 (see figure below). As always, the responder must Accept (A) or Reject (R). Suppose that this game is played by two egoists who care only about their money. Which of the following statements are true? (Multiple Choice) XXX $0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 || $8 $9 $10 A R ($6,$4) ($0,$0) A. Player 2's threat to reject a low offer is not credible; player 1 anticipates this and offers nothing. B. The Nash equilibrium is: Player 2 accepts no offers and Player 1 offers nothing. C. The Nash equilibrium is: Player 2 accepts all offers and Player 1 offers nothing. D. When played with real-world subjects, few people actually play the Nash strategy.arrow_forward
- You were presented with a utility maximizing rule which states: If you always choose the item with the greatest marginal utility per dollar spent, when your budget is exhausted, the utility maximizing choice should occur where the marginal utility per dollar spent is the same for both goods. That rule is expressed as follows: Group of answer choices (The marginal utility associated with good 1 / the price of good 2) = (the marginal utility associated with good 2 / the price of good 1) % change in price / % change in quantity (The marginal utility associated with good 1 / the price of good 1) = (the marginal utility associated with good 2 / the price of good 2) The marginal utility per dollar of good 1 > the marginal utility per dollar of good 2.arrow_forwardConsider the following game - one card is dealt to player 1 ( the sender) from a standard deck of playing cards. The card may either be red (heart or diamond) or black (spades or clubs). Player 1 observes her card, but player 2 (the receiver) does not - Player 1 decides to Play (P) or Not Play (N). If player 1 chooses not to play, then the game ends and the player receives -1 and player 2 receives 1. - If player 1 chooses to play, then player 2 observes this decision (but not the card) and chooses to Continue (C) or Quit (Q). If player 2 chooses Q, player 1 earns a payoff of 1 and player 2 a payoff of -1 regardless of player 1's card - If player 2 chooses continue, player 1 reveals her card. If the card is red, player 1 receives a payoff of 3 and player 2 a payoff of -3. If the card is black, player 1 receives a payoff of 2 and player 2 a payoff of -1 a. Draw the extensive form game b. Draw the Bayesian form gamearrow_forwardUse the scenario below to answer the question. Chocolate raisin protein bars are Duc’s favorite dessert. A local bakery sells them for $1.00 each. Duc buys one and eats it at the bakery. Duc decides that he wants another one, but is not willing to pay full price. He knows the owner of the bakery and wants to negotiate. He offers to buy two more protein bars at $0.75 each. He plans to eat one at the store and anther one later. The bakery owner agrees to the deals. What is the total utility of Duc’s decision? 00 75 50 00arrow_forward
- Type out the correct answer ASAP with proper explanation of it In the Ultimatum Game, player 1 is given some money (e.g. $10; this is public knowledge), and may give some or all of this to player 2. In turn, player 2 may accept player 1’s offer, in which case the game is over; or player 2 may reject player 1’s offer, in which case neither player gets any money, and the game is over. a. If you are player 2 and strictly rational, explain why you would accept any positive offer from player 1. b. In reality, many players reject offers from player 1 that are significantly below 50%. Whyarrow_forwardWithin a voluntary contribution game, the Nash equilibrium level of contribution is zero, but in experiments, it is often possible to sustain positive levels of contribution for a long period. How might we best explain this? A) Participants are altruistic, and so value the payoff which other participants receive, benefiting (indirectly) from making a contribution. B) Participants believe that if they make a contribution, then other participants will be more likely to make a contribution. C) Participants in experiments believe that they have to make contributions in order to receive any payoff from their participation. D) Participants have experience of working in situations in which cooperation can be sustained for mutual benefit and so have internalised a social norm of cooperationarrow_forwardConsider the two Nash equilibria found above. Is any one of them a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)? Explain. In particular, consider each NE and argue why they are or are not part of a PBE. [Note: A complete description of PBE must specify beliefs as a part of description of the equilibrium.]arrow_forward
- Problem 2: Brian wants to use his recent knowledge of utility to develop his own utility function for how many hours he should study for future tests. He mainly cares about two attributes: the number of hours he studies (x), and the mark (out of 100) that he gets (y). His research of utility functions shows that when a decision maker has to decide based on more than one attribute, a multi-linear multi-attribute utility function can be developed. This function follows the form U(x, y) = kxUx(x) + kyUy(y) + (1 − kx-ky)Ux(x)Uy(y), where Ux(x) and Uy(y), are independent utility functions for attribute x and attribute y, and kx and ky are constants. If Brian just considers the number of hours he studies, he believes his utility function for the number of hours he studies is: Ux(x) : = 1 x² - where 0 ≤ x ≤ 4. If Brian just considers the 16 = mark he gets, his utility function is: Uy(y) : ) y , where 0 ≤ y ≤ 100. Brian is indifferent J 100 between (i) studying 0 hours and getting a mark of 49…arrow_forwardSean is arguing with his girlfriend, Yvette. They have been going out for a little more than two years. YVETTE: I'm leaving you, Sean. Get over it. SEAN: Are you saying that being single will make you happier than you've been with me? Speaking personally, I think the utility we've had in this relationship was much more than you could have had if you'd been single this whole time! YVETTE: I had taken an economics class and the word "utility" rings a bell. It's not that at all. We've had a fine time. It's that the utility I would get by continuing our relationship isn't worth it anymore. SEAN: I've never been dumped by someone citing the law of before. You're a piece of work, you know that? Yvette doesn't hear. She has already walked off, leaving Sean feeling like something of a sunk cost.arrow_forwardOther bookmarks E Reading list Consider a two-person general equilibrium with two economic agents A and B. Agent A's utility function is: U^(r*, «$) = log(x4)+ log(x") Agent B's utility function is: U*(xf, r}) = 2 log xf + = The endowments are: {(w, w), (wf,w)} = {(1,2), (1,2)} Denote the relative price by p > 0. ** Part a Find the demands of Good 1 of Person A and B given an arbitrary relative price p. ** Part b Using the market clearing condition for Good 1, find the competitive equilibrium price p. ** Part c Solve for the contract curve in terms of (x, x).arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
- Principles of Economics (12th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134078779Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. OsterPublisher:PEARSONEngineering Economy (17th Edition)EconomicsISBN:9780134870069Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick KoellingPublisher:PEARSON
- Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781305585126Author:N. Gregory MankiwPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...EconomicsISBN:9781259290619Author:Michael Baye, Jeff PrincePublisher:McGraw-Hill Education
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:9780134078779
Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:9780134870069
Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:9781305585126
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...
Economics
ISBN:9781259290619
Author:Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:McGraw-Hill Education