EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
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Chapter 15, Problem 7RQ
To determine
To explain:Reason to bid in a second price, sealed price auction and not in first − price, sealed-bid auction. Also, worse idea when value of good is uncertain.
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Explain why a player in a sealed-bid, second-price auction would never submit a bid that exceeds his or her true value of the object being sold. (Hint: What if all players submitted bids greater than their valuations of the object?)
Consider the following scenarios in the Ultimatum game, viewed from the perspective of the Recipient. Assume that the Recipient is motivated by negative reciprocity and will gain $15 of
value from rejecting an offer that is strictly less than 50 percent of the total amount to be divided between the two players by the Proposer. Assume that the Proposer can only make offers
in increments of $1.
If the pot is $30, what is the minimum offer that the Responder will accept? What percent of the pie is this amount?
The minimum offer that will be accepted is S. which represents percent of the pie.
If the pot is $100, what is the minimum offer that the Responder will accept? What percent of the pie is this amount?
The minimum offer that will be accepted is S, which represents percent of the pie. (Round answers to 2 decimal places as needed)
Why it is unwise to bid less than your valuation of the good in a sealed bid second-price auction.
In the first price sealed bid auction, a player gets a positive payoff by doing bid shading. Explain the tradeoff between biding lower than the value of the object and biding very close to value of the object.
Chapter 15 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 15.2 - Prob. 1TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 2TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 1MQCh. 15.2 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 15.2 - Prob. 2.1MQCh. 15.2 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 2.1TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 1.2TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 2.2TTACh. 15.3 - Prob. 1MQ
Ch. 15.3 - Prob. 2MQCh. 15.4 - Prob. 1MQCh. 15.4 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 15.4 - Prob. 2.1MQCh. 15.5 - Prob. 1TTACh. 15.5 - Prob. 2TTACh. 15.5 - Prob. 1MQCh. 15.5 - Prob. 2MQCh. 15 - Prob. 1RQCh. 15 - Prob. 2RQCh. 15 - Prob. 3RQCh. 15 - Prob. 4RQCh. 15 - Prob. 5RQCh. 15 - Prob. 6RQCh. 15 - Prob. 7RQCh. 15 - Prob. 8RQCh. 15 - Prob. 9RQCh. 15 - Prob. 10RQCh. 15 - Prob. 15.1PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.2PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.3PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.4PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.5PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.6PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.7PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.8PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.9PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.10P
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