Assume that two people are bargaining over how to splt the surplus of theirjoint efforts, which total $100. The only difference between the two is that player A has an associated interest rate of 5 percent and player B has an associated interest rate of 20 percent. Based on Nash bargaining theory, what share of the $100 will Player A wind up with? (Please provide your answer in $ style format,)

We can see from the payoff matrix that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game because at least one firm would always have an incentive to change its behavior. ​ From​ Nash's​ theorem, we know there must be at least one Nash equilibrium so there must be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this game.   Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium by first deleting all dominated strategies in the game   What's the expected payoff to Firm 1 in the equilibrium?

Suppose that Lionel Messi is negotiating a contract with FC Barcelona. Messi has an offer from Real Madrid for $20 million a year. If he signs with FC Barcelona, they will earn $90 million in revenue from the signing. FC Barcelona's next best option is to sign Cristiano Ronaldo. They would earn $70 million from signing Ronaldo and would pay him a contract of $10 million. Messi's bargaining power is w = 1/2. a) What is the negotiated salary between Messi and FC Barcelona under Nash Bargaining? What is Messi's surplus and what is FČ Barcelona's surplus? b) Due to an injury, FC Barcelona would only earn $50 million from signing Ronaldo but everything else remains the same. What is the negotiated salary between Messi and FC Barcelona under Nash Bargaining? What is Messi's surplus and what is FC Barcelona's surplus?

We can see from the payoff matrix that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game because at least one firm would always have an incentive to change its behavior. ​ From​ Nash's​ theorem, we know there must be at least one Nash equilibrium so there must be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this game. Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium by first deleting all dominated strategies in the game What's the expected payoff to Firm 2 in the equilibrium?