Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134492049
Author: Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, John List
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 14, Problem 7P
(a)
To determine
Pay-off matrix for a game between two firms and its Nash equilibrium.
(b)
To determine
Pay-off matrix and Nash equilibrium when both Coke and Pepsi have loyal buyers regardless of the price.
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Describe the game and find all Nash equilibria in the following situation: Each of two players chooses a non-negative number. In the choice (a1, a2), the payoff of the first player is equal to a1(a2 - a1), and the payoff of the second player is equal to a2(1 – a1 – a2).
Find all Nash equilibria in the next game
Find the Nash Equilibria for each of the following 2x2 games (The left payoff value is associated with the
strategies (1 or 2) while the right payoff value is associated with the strategies (A or B)):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
B
1
3,3
2 4,4 5,5
1
2
1
2
1
2
A
2,2
24
A
B
2,5 0,3
4,0
-5,2
A
1,0
0,6
B
4,1
5,5
A
B
-1,-3 -3,2
-4,1 0,0
Chapter 14 Solutions
Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
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