EBK PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (SECON
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780393616149
Author: Mateer
Publisher: W.W.NORTON+CO. (CC)
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Question
Chapter 13, Problem 9SP
(a):
To determine
Dominant strategy of the pizza factory.
(b):
To determine
Dominant strategy of the P pie.
(c):
To determine
Nash Equilibrium in the game.
(d):
To determine
Impact of P pie entrance and action of P factory.
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Check out a sample textbook solutionStudents have asked these similar questions
Two firms operating in the same market must decide between charging a high price or a low
price. The Payoffs are as below. Firm A's profit is listed before the comma, B's profit after the
comma.
Firm B
Firm A
Low Price
High Price
Low Price
16, 17
7, 28
High Price
28, 7
22, 22
If each firm tries to choose a price that is optimal, regardless of the other firm's price, what is
the Nash equilibrium? Does either firm have a dominant strategy?
Fill in the chart attached and answer the following questions:
a) Bert's dominant strategy is to: (pick the correct answer below )
- no dominant strategy
- fish for 20 hours per week
-fish for 40 hours per week.
b) Ernie's dominant strategy is to: ( pick the correct answer below)
- no dominant strategy
- fish for 20 hours per week
-fish for 40 hours per week.
c) Is there a Nash Equilibrium? ( pick the correct answer below)
- No
- Yes, both fish for 20 hours per week
- Yes, one fisher for 40 and the other for 20.
- Yes both fish for 30 hours per week.
d) Is there an incentive for Bert and Ernie to collude? Why or why not?
Consider a market organized along a 1 mile stretch of road (from D=0 to D=1). Consumers along the stretch of road are uniformly distributed. There are two firms, with Firm 1 located at mile marker .5 and Firm 2 located at mile marker 1.0 and they compete on prices. Customers choose which store to shop at according to P + cD, where c=2 and D is the distance to the store. What is the Nash Equilibrium?
Chapter 13 Solutions
EBK PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (SECON
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Use the information in the following table, which summarizes the payoffs (i.e., profit) to two firms that must decide between an average-quality and a high quality product, to answer the questions that follow: Firm 2 Average Quality High Quality Firm 1 Average Quality 600, 600 400, 1100 High Quality 1100, 400 900, 900 a. What is each player's dominant strategy? Explain your reasoning.b. Referring to the table above, is this an example of a prisoner's dilemma game? Why or why not?c. Is there a Nash equilibrium? If so, what is it?arrow_forwardUsing a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose there are only two firms that sell smart phones, Flashfone and Pictech. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its phones. Pictech Pricing High Low Flashfone Pricing High 11, 11 2, 18 Low 18, 2 10, 10 For example, the lower, left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $18 million and Pictech will earn a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a ______ price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a _____ price. If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a _____ price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make more…arrow_forwardLittle Kona is a small coffee company that is considering entering a market dominated by Big Brew. Each company’s profit depends on whether Little Kona enters and whether Big Brew sets a high price or a low price:a. Does either player in this game have a dominant strategy?b. Does your answer to part (a) help you figure out what the other player should do?c. What is the Nash equilibrium? Is there only one?d. Big Brew threatens Little Kona by saying, “If you enter, we’re going to set a low price, so you had better stay out.” Do you think Little Kona should believe the threat? Why or why not?c. If the two firms could collude and agree on how to split the total profits, what outcome would they pick?arrow_forward
- The above table shows the payoffs that either Darrin or Rob receive depending on whether they choose a high or a low price strategy. Who has a dominant strategy? A. Darrin. B. Rob. C. Darrin and Rob. D. Neither Darrin nor Rob.arrow_forwardWhat is the difference between Dominant strategy and mixed strategy? Please explainarrow_forwardConsider two beer producers, POTUS Pilsner and Supreme Court Stout. If they advertise, they can both sell more beer and increase their revenue. However, the cost of advertising more than offsets the increased revenue so that each producer ends up with a lower profit than if they do not advertise. On the other hand, if only one advertises, that producer increases its market share and also its profit. Construct a payoff matrix using the following hypothetical information: If neither producer advertises, each earns a profit of $35 million per year. If both advertise, each earns a profit of $20 million per year. If one advertises and the other does not, the producer who advertises earns a profit of $50 million and the producer who does not advertise earns a profit of $9 million. If POTUS Pilsner wants to maximize profit, will it advertise? Briefly explain. If Supreme Court Stout wants to maximize profit, will it advertise? Briefly explain. Is there a dominant strategy for each…arrow_forward
- What is the difference, if any, between a dominant strategy and a Nash equilibrium? Give examples.arrow_forwardConsider two firms choosing quantities sequentially in a duopoly setting (i.e. the Stackelberg game). The two firms have identical products. Each firm has no fixed costs, and faces marginal costs equal to 5 plus the quantity it produces (i.e. MC = 5 + q). Market demand is given by Q = 46 - P, where Q is market quantity and P is market price. In equilibrium, how much will the firm that moves first produce?arrow_forwardDefine a dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium. Can two firms interacting with each other have no Nash equilibria if both have a dominant strategy?arrow_forward
- Consider the following game theory matrix with two firms and the effects of profits with the preferences on high versus low advertising budgets. Firm B's advertising Firm A's advertising A = low, $100 Blow, $100 A-low, B-high, $120 A = high, $120 B = low, $60 A=high, $80 B = high, $80 Identify the best strategy for firm B? a) Advertise High b) Advertise low. c) Don't advertise. d) Can't be decided with the given information.arrow_forwardUsing a payoff matrix/table to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose there are only two firms that sell smartphones, Flashfone and Pictech. The following payoff matrix/table shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its phones. Pictech Pricing High Low Flashfone Pricing High 10, 10 4, 12 Low 12, 4 9, 9 For example, the lower left cell shows that if Flashfone prices low and Pictech prices high, Flashfone will earn a profit of $12 million and Pictech will earn a profit of $4 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Flashfone and Pictech are both profit-maximizing firms. If Flashfone prices high, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Flashfone prices low, Pictech will make more profit if it chooses a price. If Pictech prices high, Flashfone will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Pictech prices low, Flashfone will make…arrow_forwardA small town has a duopoly in its tattoo market. Two firms, "Thread the Needle" and "Ink about it" are both competitors. Daily profit is listed in the payoff matrix. The green payouts belong to "Thread the Needle" and the red, "Ink about it". In this game, what is the Nash Equilibrium? A Thread the Needle: don't advertise, Ink about it: don't advertise B Thread the Needle: don't advertise, Ink about it: advertise C Thread the Needle: advertise, Ink about it: advertise D Thread the Needle: advertise, Ink about it: don't advertisearrow_forward
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