EBK PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (SECON
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780393616149
Author: Mateer
Publisher: W.W.NORTON+CO. (CC)
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Question
Chapter 13, Problem 7SP
(a):
To determine
Output and price when the number of suppliers increases.
(b):
To determine
Output and price when there is only a single seller.
(c):
To determine
Impact of cartel.
(d):
To determine
Impact of cheating in the cartel by increasing the production.
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Consider an industry with 4 firms with the same total cost function TC(q) = 20q. The demand function is p= 260 − 2Q. (a) Solve for Cournot equilibrium: how much each firm produces in equilibrium? What is an equilibrium price and profits? (b) What will be the profit of each firm if all the firms join the cartel? (c) If one of the firms wants to deviate from the cartel agreement, what output should it set? Calculate the profit of the cheating firm.
The table shows the demand schedule for a particular product.
Quantity
Price
0
100
300
90
600
80
900
70
1200
60
1500
50
1800
40
2100
30
2400
20
2700
10
3000
0
Suppose the market for this product is served by two firms who have formed a cartel and are colluding to set the price and quantity in this market. If the marginal cost to produce this product is constant at $40 per unit, then what price will the cartel set in this market?
a. $40 b. $50 c. $60 d. $70 e. $80
please assist with f and h. Two dairy farmers produce milk for a local town with local milk demand given by Q=100-1/3P(P denotes price measured in Rands, Q denotes the quantity measured in liters). Both farmers have the same cost function given by TC=150+2q (where q denotes output).
(f) Calculate the profits if farmer 2 decides to break the cartel agreement (g) Does joining a cartel offer any benefits to both farmers? Justify your answer (h) What if farmer 1 is a leader and farmer 2 a follower, determine the price, quantity andprofits made by these two farmers
Chapter 13 Solutions
EBK PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (SECON
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