![Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Instant Access (Pearson+)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780136879572/9780136879572_largeCoverImage.gif)
Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Instant Access (Pearson+)
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780136879572
Author: Robert Pindyck, Daniel Rubinfeld
Publisher: PEARSON+
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 13, Problem 4E
(a)
To determine
Nash equilibria outcome.
(b)
To determine
Maximin strategy outcome.
(c)
To determine
Cooperative outcome.
(d)
To determine
Benefit of cooperative outcome,
Expert Solution & Answer
![Check Mark](/static/check-mark.png)
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solution![Blurred answer](/static/blurred-answer.jpg)
Students have asked these similar questions
Suppose two firms (A and B) are competing in price. Each firm can charge either High or Low price
and the payoffs (profit or loss) from these strategies are presented below:
Firm B
High
50, -40
10, 10
Low
Firm A
Low
0,0
High
-40, 50
a. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria
b. If this game is played ten times by these two firms, find all pure strategy Nash equilibria
c. Suppose this game is played infinitely and these firms agreed to charge high price in order
to earn profits of Gh10 each but a firm will charge low price if its rival cheats. Find the a
discount rate that will cause a firm to cheat
d. Suppose the discount rate is 40% will the collusion strategies constitute a Nash Equilibrium
Two firms, Tim Horbucks and Startons, consider enter the market for take-out coffee, or not. The profit
each firm can make (in dollars) is indicated in the table below, where the fixed cost of producing is F
dollars.
What is the largest value of F below which the game has a UNIQUE Nash equilibrium in pure strategies?
Startons
Enter
Not Enter
Enter
400 - F, 400 - F
600 - F,0
Tim Horbucks
Not Enter
0, 600 - F
0 ,0
Enter a positive number below, in dollars.
Find the Nash equilibrium strategy and payoff in this simultaneous game. Show your work.
Firms can collude (C) or not collude (NC) and their profits in millions are as follows.
Please see attached.
Chapter 13 Solutions
Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Instant Access (Pearson+)
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Economics Consider two firms that are choosing the price of competing products. The choices are contained in the payoff table. Each firm can raise price, lower price, or maintain their price. Suppose the game is played once each period forever. If both players play the strategy "always lower price" is this a Nash equilibrium? Let b = discount rate, 0 < b <1. Raise price Maintain price Lower price Firm B Raise price Maintain price Lower price 6. 4 8. 8 1.1 5, 5 4, 6 7.2 1.1 3.3 Firm A 2.7 No. because it is dominated by raising the price. No, because it is dominated by both firms raising the price. No, because it is dominated by maintaining the price. Yes.arrow_forwardTwo firms produce Bliffs. They compete by simultaneously choosing prices in a single period. The demand for Bliffs is given by P(Q) = 100-2Q where Q is market quantity and P is market price. Firm 1 has costs C1(q1) = 20q1 and Firm 2 has costs C2(q2) = 10q2. Which statement is true? In the Nash equilibrium to the game, both firms play dominated strategies None of the other answers are correct O In the Nash equilibrium to the game, both firms play dominant strategies In the Nash equilibrium to the game, both firms slowly lower prices towards marginal costs O In the Nash equilibrium to the game, both firms set price equal to marginal costarrow_forwardClass Exercise Chapter 13: Game Theory Two firms are in the chocolate market. Each can choose to go for the high end of the market (high quality) or the low end (low quality). Resulting profits are given by the following payoff matrix: Firm 2 Low -20, -30 High 100, 800 Firm Low 1 High 900, 600 50, 50 a. What outcomes, if any, are Nash equilibria? b. If the managers of both firms are conservative and each follows a maximin strategy, what will be the outcome? c. What is the cooperative outcome? d. Which firm benefits most from the cooperative outcome? How much would that firm need to offer the other to persuade it to collude?arrow_forward
- Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop TV, Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix : MATRIX IS ATTACHED Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both firms make their decisions at the same time. (explain the decision step by step) If each firm is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium? (explain the decision step by step) What will be the equilibrium if Firm X makes its selection first? If Firm Y goes first?arrow_forwardWhat is the Nash equilibrium? a) Both firms advertise. b) Both firms do not advertise c) Firm 1 advertises and Firm 2 does not. d) No Nash equilibrium for this game. e) Firm 2 advertises and Firm 1 does not. Suppose Firm 1 gets 2 instead of 4 when both firms advertise. What is the Nash equilibrium? a) Firm 1 advertises and Firm 2 does not. b) No Nash equilibrium for this game. c) Both firms advertise d) Firm 2 advertises and Firm 1 does not e)Both firms do not advertisearrow_forwardIf Bean Bruuer advertises, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it chooses If Bean Bruuer doesn't advertise, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it chooses Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? Hatte Latte will choose not to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise. Both firms choose to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose not to advertise. Again, suppose that both firms start off not advertising. If the firms decide to collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? Hatte Latte will choose to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose not to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose not to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise.arrow_forward
- Imagine two Pizzerias are playing a static game where the firms have to choose their strategies simultaneously, selecting a strategy that maximizes its profit given what it believes the other firm will do. Their decision is how many pizzas to produce. They can choose between producing 100, 150 or 200 pizzas each. The profit for respective firm is showed in the payoff matrix below. a) What is the solution (if there is one) and also describe the characteristic features of this game. b) If this game was played repeatedly, could that potentially change the outcome of the game? In your answer, you are expected to motivate and describe how.arrow_forwardO Cell A O Cell C O Cell E O Cell I None of the abovearrow_forwardSuppose Proctor & Gamble (PG) and Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) are simultaneously considering new advertising campaigns. Each firm may choose a high, medium or low level of advertising. a. What are each firm’s best responses to its rival’s strategies? b. Does either firm have a dominant strategy? c. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game?arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
- Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage Learning
- Exploring EconomicsEconomicsISBN:9781544336329Author:Robert L. SextonPublisher:SAGE Publications, IncManagerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...EconomicsISBN:9781305506381Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. HarrisPublisher:Cengage Learning
![Text book image](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781337106665/9781337106665_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning
![Text book image](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781544336329/9781544336329_smallCoverImage.jpg)
Exploring Economics
Economics
ISBN:9781544336329
Author:Robert L. Sexton
Publisher:SAGE Publications, Inc
![Text book image](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781305506381/9781305506381_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:Cengage Learning
![Text book image](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781285859460/9781285859460_smallCoverImage.gif)