EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
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Chapter 12, Problem 12.9P
To determine
To Compute: the sub game-perfect equilibrium for
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Check out a sample textbook solutionStudents have asked these similar questions
Consider a game where a potential market Entrant is trying to decide whether or not to enter the
market. An Incumbent monopolist is established and can choose to cut the price, maintain the
price, or raise the price in hopes of deterring the Entrant from entering.
Incumbent
Entrant
Enter
Stay Out
Cut Price
-4,4
0,9
Maintain
Price
4,6
0,12
Raise
Price
5,5
0, 13
a) Suppose the Entrant and the Incumbent make their decisions simultaneously. Is there a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, what is it?
b) Suppose the players move sequentially, and that the Entrant moves first. Set up the game tree
and solve for the equilibrium path. Can the Incumbent deter entry? Explain.
c) Now suppose that the Incumbent moves first. Again, set up the game tree. What is the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome now? Can the Incumbent deter entry now?
1. Consider an industry with inverse demand given by p = 8 – q, where p is the price, and q is the quantity. There is one incumbent firm and one potential entrant. In the first stage of the game, the incumbent chooses its quantity qi. In the second stage, the potential entrant observes qi and chooses its quantity Ce. The potential entrant can also decide not to enter the market. The production technology of both firms are represented by the cost function C = 2q. To enter industry implies a fixed entry cost of F.
(a) Find the equilibrium of the game, assuming that the potential entrant enters the industry. What are the profits of firms?
(b) Assume that entry is not blockaded. For which values of F does the incumbent firm prefer to deter entry?
(c) For which values of F, entry blockaded?
A monopolist is being challenged by a new entrant. The payoff table below shows the two firms’ profits (in thousands of dollars). The incumbent monopolist (player 2) can choose between high and low levels of advertising—High and Low, respectively. The challenger can choose to enter the market or stay out of the market—Enter and Exit, respectively.
High
Low
Enter
5, 170
50, 150
Exit
0, 175
0, 200
True/False/Uncertain and Explain:
The monopolist makes a credible threat to increase its advertising (chooses “High”) if the challenger enters the market, and as a result the challenger does not enter the market (chooses “Exit”).
Chapter 12 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 12.2 - Prob. 1TTACh. 12.2 - Prob. 2TTACh. 12.2 - Prob. 1MQCh. 12.2 - Prob. 2MQCh. 12.2 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 12.2 - Prob. 2.1TTACh. 12.2 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 12.3 - Prob. 1MQCh. 12.3 - Prob. 2MQCh. 12.3 - Prob. 1TTA
Ch. 12.3 - Prob. 2TTACh. 12.3 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 12.3 - Prob. 2.1MQCh. 12.3 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 12.3 - Prob. 2.1TTACh. 12.4 - Prob. 1TTACh. 12.4 - Prob. 2TTACh. 12.5 - Prob. 1MQCh. 12.5 - Prob. 2MQCh. 12.5 - Prob. 1TTACh. 12.5 - Prob. 2TTACh. 12.6 - Prob. 1MQCh. 12.6 - Prob. 2MQCh. 12 - Prob. 1RQCh. 12 - Prob. 2RQCh. 12 - Prob. 3RQCh. 12 - Prob. 4RQCh. 12 - Prob. 5RQCh. 12 - Prob. 6RQCh. 12 - Prob. 7RQCh. 12 - Prob. 8RQCh. 12 - Prob. 9RQCh. 12 - Prob. 10RQCh. 12 - Prob. 12.1PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.2PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.3PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.4PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.5PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.6PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.7PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.8PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.9PCh. 12 - Prob. 12.10P
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