Question 6 of 14 Attempt 2 6. Trigger strategies in repeated games a. Under a tit-for-tat strategy, a player retaliates permanently against any decision by an opponent to defect- b. Under a grim trigger strategy, a player allows an opponent to defect one or more times before retaliating c. Under a trembling hand trigger strategy, a player repeats each prior move of a competitor d. In the box below, rank the three trigger strategies in order of harshest to most lenient.

Game Theory. Elaborate an example of a mixed strategy, includes explanations of the development of the solution. Please be as clear as possible.

Terry's payoff is the first number in each cell and a higher number is a better outcome. Assume that Terry and Kerry make their decisions simultaneously. Kerry Clean Don't clean Terry Clean ( 8, 2) ( 3, 5 ) Don't ( 10, 3) ( 4, 1 ) clean The Nash equilibrium of this game is Terry will [Select ] v and Kerry will [ [ Select ]

8. Use the payoffs T> R > P> S to make the game to the right the Prisoner's Dilemma. Use each payoff once per player. DO NOT substitute numerical values for the symbolic payoffs. defect cooperate Defect Cooperate a. Under what conditions (on t) is the Grim Trigger Strategy a Nash equilibrium for the repeated version of the game when t is the expected number of additional periods. b. Provide intuition for the conditions that you found in (a). Also provide a graph with payoffs on the Y-axis and time on the X-axis that supports you intuition. Note: in deriving your answer you do not need to make a new game box. Be judicious about the payoffs that you compare.

Which one of the following statements about the (modified) Stackleberg model is incorrect?   A. Firm 1's move is a strategic move.   B. Firm 2's move is a strategic move.   C. It is can be solved by backward induction.   D. It is a dynamic game.

Solve the attahment.

Japan's Elpida Memory entered court management and was acquired by Micron. The media reportedthat it was the result of the semiconductor chicken game.￭Question (a) Where is the Nash Equilibrium?￭Question (b) What is the mixed-strategy equilibrium?  – find out x and y￭Question (c) What is the probability of a chicken game?

3. The following is an interpretation of the rivalry between the United States (USA) and the Soviet Ünion (USSR) during the cold war. Each side has the choice of two strategies: Aggressive and Restrained. The payoff table is given as follows: USSR Restrained Aggressiveness Restrained 4,3 1,4 USA Aggressiveness 3,1 2,2 a) Consider this game when the two countries move simultaneously. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. b) Next consider three alternative ways in which the game could be played with sequential moves: (i) The USA moves first and the USSR moves second. (i) the USSR moves first and the USA moves second. (i) The USSR moves first, and the USA moves second, but the USSR has a further move after the USA moves. For each case, draw the game tree and find the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. c) What are the key strategic issues (commitment, credibility and so on) for the two countries. (Note: Be concise. Your answer should not exceed 300 words].

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In the following games, all payoffs are listed with the row player's payoffs first and the column player's payoffs second. GAME 33 Player A Player B B1 10, 12 A1 A2 9,3 A3 8, 10 In Game 33 above, B2 B3 8,8 12, 10 7,6 11, 1 9,4 14, 3 B1 is a dominated strategy for Player B B2 is a dominated strategy for Player B B3 is a dominated strategy for Player B Player B has no dominated strategies.