Which one of the following statements about the (modified) Stackleberg model is incorrect?   A. Firm 1's move is a strategic move.   B. Firm 2's move is a strategic move.   C. It is can be solved by backward induction.   D. It is a dynamic game.

Use the following extensive-form game to answer the following questions. a. List the feasible strategies for player 1 and player 2. b. Identify the Nash equilibria to this game. c. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium.

Answer all the questions, show all the working.  Consider the following game in normal form.     Not cooperate Cooperate Not cooperate 20,20 50,0 Cooperate 0,50 40,40   What is Nash equilibrium? Is it efficient? Why? What needs to be complied with so that the players would like to cooperate? What happens when one of the players does not cooperate? Why? Define trigger strategy. Calculate the discount factor (δ) that would make both players decide to cooperate.

Which of the following statements about a Nash equilibrium is not correct?  A. Each player plays a best response to opponents' Nash strategies.   B. No player has a profitable unilateral deviation.   C. For each finite noncoopertiave game there always exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.   D. A game has at least two players.  Which one of the following statements is incorrect?  A. For dynamic games with complete information, not all subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points can be found by backward induction.   B. A finite dynamic game with complete information may also have a normal form representation.    C. A finite static game with complete information may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.   D. A finite static game with complete information cannot have an extensive form representation.  Which one of the following statements is correct?  A. A supergame cannot have any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.   B. A supergame can only have finite number of subgame perfect Nash…

6) The following is a static game D 2,2 0,3 D 3,0 1,1 a) Convert this game into dynamic form game b) Find the Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. c) If you consider this game as dynamic then what kind of dynamic game is this.

Use the following normal-form game to answer the following questions. a. For what values of x is strategy D (strictly) dominant for player 2? b. For what values of x is strategy B (strictly) dominant for player 1? c. For what values of x is (B, D) the only Nash equilibrium of the game?

Use the following payoff matrix to answer the following questions Suppose this is a one-shot game: a. Determine the dominant strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. b. Determine the secure strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. c. Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game. If such an equilibrium does not exist, explain why not.

Answer the given question with a proper explanation and step-by-step solution. The graphic above represents the decisions and payoffs to Firm A and Firm B. What is the Nash Equilibrium outcome of this game? a.Firm A: high price, Firm B: high price b.Firm A: high price, Firm B: low price c.Firm A: low price, Firm B: high price d.Firm A: low price, Firm B: low price

Which of the following is FALSE for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game? A. Every Bayesian game in which there are finitely many players and finitely many actions and types for each player, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium B. Every Bayesian game has multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria C. Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game is the Nash equilibrium of its associated ex-ante normal form game

Use the following normal-form game to answer the questions below. Player 1 (B.C) (B.D) (A.C) (A.D) Strategy A B a. Identify the one shot Nash equilibrium. 60, 60 30, 130 Yes Player Z D 130, 30 80, b. Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times, Can they achieve payoffs that are b shot Nash equilibrium?