PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 0 MC = ATC MR 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720 810 900 QUANTITY (Cans of beer) Monopoly Outcome $0.80 per can. Given this When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce 180 cans and charge information, each firm earns a daily profit of $144.00, so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is $288.00. Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Stargell decides to break the collusion and increase its output by 50%, while Schmidt continues to produce the amount set under the collusive agreement. Stargell's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to now $ , while Schmidt's profit is now $ Stargell increases its output beyond the collusive quantity. to $ per can. Stargell's profit is . Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit when

Refer to the information provided in Figure 14.1 below to answer the question(s) that follow. Demand and cost conditions for the Chewing Gum Industry $4 MC .40 .35 .31 3.30 ATC D .25 MR Q Packs of chewing gum in thousands 12 14 16 Figure 14.1 Refer to Figure 14.1. Six firms that produce chewing gum form a cartel. The cartel faces the market demand curve given by D. To maximize profits, the cartel should produce packs of chewing gum and the price should be O a. 14,000; $.30 O b. 12,000; $.40 O c. 16,000; $.35 O d. 12,000; $.25 Dollars.

The table below shows quantity, total revenue, marginal revenue, total cost, and marginal cost for an unregulated natural monopoly firm. Calculate the price that corresponds to the profit-maximizing quantity of goods. Round your answer to two decimal places if necessary.  Quantity Total Revenue Marginal Revenue Total Cost Marginal Cost 11 $105.00$⁢105.00 $105.00$⁢105.00 $100.00$⁢100.00   22 $189.00$⁢189.00 $84.00$⁢84.00 $162.00$⁢162.00 $62.00$⁢62.00 33 $247.50$⁢247.50 $58.50$⁢58.50 $220.50$⁢220.50 $58.50$⁢58.50 44 $282.00$⁢282.00 $34.50$⁢34.50 $265.00$⁢265.00 $44.50$⁢44.50 55 $300.50$⁢300.50 $18.50$⁢18.50 $305.00$⁢305.00 $40.00$⁢40.00 66 $300.00$⁢300.00 −$0.50−$⁢0.50 $339.00$⁢339.00 $34.00$⁢34.00

17. Demand is given by Q = 220 P. Marginal cost is $120. Calculate the market equilibrium price, output, and any profits for: a. b. C. a monopoly context ? a Bertrand duopoly a Cournot duopoly

Can you help me solve this please?

There is an unregulated firm with a natural monopoly. The table below shows quantity of goods to be produced, price, total revenue, total cost, marginal revenue, marginal cost, and average cost.  Quantity Price Total Revenue Marginal Revenue Total Cost Marginal Cost Average Cost 11 $18.00$⁢18.00 $18.00$⁢18.00 $18.00$⁢18.00 $17.00$⁢17.00   $17.00$⁢17.00 22 $17.00$⁢17.00 $34.00$⁢34.00 $16.00$⁢16.00 $33.00$⁢33.00 $16.00$⁢16.00 $16.50$⁢16.50 33 $15.00$⁢15.00 $45.00$⁢45.00 $11.00$⁢11.00 $45.00$⁢45.00 $12.00$⁢12.00 $15.00$⁢15.00 44 $12.00$⁢12.00 $48.00$⁢48.00 $3.00$⁢3.00 $55.00$⁢55.00 $10.00$⁢10.00 $13.75$⁢13.75 55 $10.00$⁢10.00 $50.00$⁢50.00 $2.00$⁢2.00 $63.00$⁢63.00 $8.00$⁢8.00 $12.60$⁢12.60 66 $8.00$⁢8.00 $48.00$⁢48.00 −$2.00−$⁢2.00 $70.20$⁢70.20 $7.20$⁢7.20 $11.70$⁢11.70 77 $6.50$⁢6.50 $45.50$⁢45.50 −$2.50−$⁢2.50 $77.00$⁢77.00 $6.80$⁢6.80 $11.00$⁢11.00 88 $5.00$⁢5.00 $40.00$⁢40.00 −$5.50−$⁢5.50 $84.80$⁢84.80 $7.80$⁢7.80 $10.60$⁢10.60 Determine how many goods the…

Price MC 500 700 900 Quantity Five firms in an industry have equal and constant marginal costs and act as a cartel, with each firm agreeing to charge a price of $9. If they each sell an equal quantity of output, each firm will earn $ type your answer in revenue. If one firm decides to increase its quantity sold by 200 units, the cheating firms revenue will increase by $ type your anwer and the remaining firms will see tir total revenue decrease by $ type your anwwer.

4. Imagine a market with demand P = 420 – Q in each period. Two firms are thinking about colluding. They each have cost C(Qi) = 60Qi. If they cooperate and behave as a monopoly, then they have a marginal revenue curve, MRm = 420 – 2Q, and a marginal cost curve, MCm = 60. If they are in a cartel, then the firms will split the monopoly production and profits. If they compete, then they face MRi = 420 – 2Qi – Q-I and MCi = 60. a. If the firms stick to their agreement (cooperate), how much per-period profit do they each make? b. If they are not able to maintain their agreement (compete), what is their per-period profit? c. If one firm cheats on their agreement (deviate), how much does each firm make? Be sure to specify both the profit for the cheater and the firm cheated-on. d. Suppose the firms assume that their interaction will last forever (r = 1) and they share the common discount value R. What is the lowest value of R such that both firms are willing to continue with the cartel…

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