Consider a market with two identical firms, Firm A and Firm B. The market demand is: 1 P = 100 –Q where Q = Qa + QB . The cost conditions are MC, = MCg = AC, = ACg = 24. (Hint: Round your solutions to 2 decimal places.) a) Assume this market has a Stackelberg leader, Firm A. Solve for the quantity, price and profit for each firm. Explain your calculations. b) How does this compare to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity, price and profit? Explain your calculations. c) Present the Stackelberg and Cournot equilibrium output using a diagram. d) Solve for the Bertrand equilibrium output, price and profit for each firm. Explain your calculations. Does the solution justify the Bertrand paradox? e) The crude oil market can be described as a Nash-Cournot market, in which Saudi Arabia acts as Stackelberg leader. Do you agree with this statement?

Time remaining: 00:09:51 Economics The market demand function is Q=10,000-1,000p. Each firm has a marginal cost of m=$0.16. Firm 1, the leader, acts before Firm 2, the follower. Solve for the Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits. Compare your solution to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=___________ units and q2=____________units The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$_____________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_______________ and profit2=$_______________ The Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities are: q1=______________units and q2=______________units The Cournot-Nash equilibrium price is: p=$______________ Profits for the firms are profit1=$_____________ and profit2=$_______________

Why does Manuel Velasquez think that multinational corporations are in a situation akin to a prisoner’s dilemma?

QUESTION 4 Consider the decision tree below. This tree illustrates hypothetical payoffs to General Mills (GM) and Quaker Oats (Q) if they engage in a price war. GM Cut price No price cut Cut price No price cut GM₁ = $3 million/year Q = $3 million/year GM = $10 million/year Q = $2 million/year GM = $5 million/year Q = $5 million/year If GM cuts prices, the greatest potential gain is: a. $5 million per year b. $10 million per year c. $2 million per year Od. $3 million per year e. none of the above

QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2 (P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P1 Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)

Answer to the image?

Using the Surplus Approach, describe how tendencies for concentration emerge from the regular functioning of competition between capitalist firms.

I have attracted a picture of my question because I don't know how to insert a table, if possible, can you please answer the question in typing because I fell hard to understand hand written works, thanks

There are two oil producers, Saudi Arabia and Iran (these are countries which we are treating as players in this example).  The market price will be $60/barrel if the total volume of sales is 9 million barrels daily, $50 if the total volume of sales is 11 million barrels daily, and $35 if the total volume of sales is 13 million barrels daily.  Saudi Arabia has two strategies; either produce 8 million barrels daily or 6 million.  Iran has two strategies; either produce 3 million barrels daily or 5 million.  Assume for simplicity that marginal cost of production is zero for both countries. Here is the normal form representation of this game (where Saudi Arabia and Iran are players, they can choose strategies over what quantity to produce and they face payoffs in terms of profits).  Note that the following paragraph is simply an explanation of this representation of the game.  If you are already comfortable with the structure, feel free to skip to the questions below the horizontal line…

5. Given that excess demands are continuous and satisfy Walras' law, use Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem to establish the existence of competitive equilibrium in a simple exchange economy. Suppose that an apple orchard is located next to a bee keeper. If the orchard produces x apples and the bee keeper produces y honey and the cost functions of the two are as follows: C(x) = x² + 10x +9 C(y) = y² - 8x What will be the socially optimal amount of apples that can be produced? How does this compare to privately optimal amount?