4.6. A person purchases a dozen eggs and must take them home. Although making trips home is costless, there is a 50 percent chance that all of the eggs carried on one trip will be broken during the trip. This person con- siders two strategies: Strategy 1: Take the dozen eggs in one trip. Strategy 2: Make two trips, taking six eggs in each trip. a. List the possible outcomes of each strategy and the probabilities of these outcomes. Show that, on aver- age, six eggs make it home under either strategy. b. Develop a graph to show the utility obtainable under each strategy. c. Could utility be improved further by taking more than two trinc? How would a .

4.6. A person purchases a dozen eggs and must take them home. Although making trips home is costless, there is a 50 percent chance that all of the eggs carried on one trip will be broken during the trip. This person con- siders two strategies: Strategy 1: Take the dozen eggs in one trip. Strategy 2: Make two trips, taking six eggs in each trip. a. List the possible outcomes of each strategy and the probabilities of these outcomes. Show that, on aver- age, six eggs make it home under either strategy. b. Develop a graph to show the utility obtainable under each strategy. c. Could utility be improved further by taking more than two trinc? How would a .

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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RUSH. Answer for a, b, and c.
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Economics 4. Suppose you are going to play a game with four other people in our class. The rule of the game is that: each of them will choose a number between and 100 (including 0 and 100). The winner of the game is the one whose chosen number is the closest to [20+* average of everyone's chosen number]. The winner can get $100 form Josie. Everyone choosing 20 is a Nash Equilibrium. (a) True (b) False please explain it in detail.
9. There are four agents who are trying to decide whether they will buy a publicly shared TV, of which the total cost is $200. The valuations of the TV are $30 for agent 1, S35 for agent 2, $70 for agent 3, and $70 for agent 4. Let c; be how much agent i will pay if the TV is purchased. Suppose c = 20, c2 = C3 = C4 = 60. According to Groves and Clarke mechanism, which one could not be the pivotal agent? A. agent 1 B. agent 2 C. agent 3 D. agent 4
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**Practice*** Amy and Bob are playing the following board game:(I) Amy starts. She has three possible actions: Pass, Attack, or Defend.(II) Bob observes what Amy chose, and then chooses between three actions with the same names: Pass, Attack, or Defend.(III) If either player passes, or one attacks and the other defends, then the game ends. But if either both players attack, or if both players defend, then Amy has to choose between two actions: Respond or Not Respond. The payoffs are as follows:- If both players pass, both players get a payoff of 0.- If a player attacks and the other player defends, the player that attacks gets a payoff of 1, while the player that defended gets a payoff of 2.- If a player passes but the other player attacks or defends, the player who passes gets a payoff of -1, and the player who attacked or defended gets a payoff of 3.- If both players attack or both players defend:– If Amy responds, she gets a payoff of 4, and Bob gets a payoff of 0.– If Amy does…
Which statements are correct?
economic Plz with explanation
4
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