3. Antitrust laws Cooperation among oligopolies runs counter to the public interest because it leads to underproduction and high prices. In an effort to bring resource allocation closer to the social optimum, public officials attempt to force oligopolies to compete instead of cooperating. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that two American investment banks negotiate a merger agreement because a financial crisis threatens to bankrupt both firms. This merger could potentially be stopped by a lawsuit brought by which of the following American institutions? O The Commerce Department O The Interior Department O The Defense Department O The Justice Department

3. Antitrust laws Cooperation among oligopolies runs counter to the public interest because it leads to underproduction and high prices. In an effort to bring resource allocation closer to the social optimum, public officials attempt to force oligopolies to compete instead of cooperating. Consider the following scenario: Suppose that two American investment banks negotiate a merger agreement because a financial crisis threatens to bankrupt both firms. This merger could potentially be stopped by a lawsuit brought by which of the following American institutions? O The Commerce Department O The Interior Department O The Defense Department O The Justice Department

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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4. Imagine a market with demand P = 420 – Q in each period. Two firms are thinking about colluding. They each have cost C(Qi) = 60Qi. If they cooperate and behave as a monopoly, then they have a marginal revenue curve, MRm = 420 – 2Q, and a marginal cost curve, MCm = 60. If they are in a cartel, then the firms will split the monopoly production and profits. If they compete, then they face MRi = 420 – 2Qi – Q-I and MCi = 60. a. If the firms stick to their agreement (cooperate), how much per-period profit do they each make? b. If they are not able to maintain their agreement (compete), what is their per-period profit? c. If one firm cheats on their agreement (deviate), how much does each firm make? Be sure to specify both the profit for the cheater and the firm cheated-on. d. Suppose the firms assume that their interaction will last forever (r = 1) and they share the common discount value R. What is the lowest value of R such that both firms are willing to continue with the cartel…
Discuss how oligopoly market structure can help explain some of the decision-making processes by firms?
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Suppose that a small town has seven burger shops whose respective shares of the local hamburger market are (as percentages of all hamburgers sold): 25 percent, 24 percent, 18 percent, 12 percent, 11 percent, 6 percent, and 4 percent. Instructions: Enter your answers as a whole number. a. What is the four-firm concentration ratio of the hamburger industry in this town? percent b. What is the Herfindahl index for the hamburger industry in this town? c. If the top three sellers combine to form a single firm, what would happen to the four-firm concentration ratio and to the Herfindahl index? Four-firm concentration ratio = percent Herfindahl index =
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Assume that the market for oil is made up of two firms: Exxon Mobil and Chevron. Also assume that New England has dozens of breweries and each of these make beers with different tastes, colors, and aromas. Which of the following statements is true? The market structure for oil is an oligopoly, and the one for beer is monopolistic competition. The market structure for oil is monopolistic competition, and the one for beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is an oligopoly. The market structure for both oil and beer is monopolistic competition.
The following table reports the four firm concentration ratio for five different industries: Part 1: Refer to the table above. In which industry do the four largest firms have the most market power? Part2: Refer to the table above. I'm which industry do the four largest firms have the least market power?
1. In a homogenous good Bertrand duopoly model with complete and symmetric information the Bertrand paradox arises because the firms compete using _________ as their choice variable. 2. Suppose there is an industry with nine firms where two of them have a market share of 0.2, three of them have a market share of 0.1 and the remaining firms have a market share of 0.075. The 4 firm concentration ratio is______. (two decimal accuracy)
Merger of beer giants faces obstacles Mega-brand beers have lost market share to wine and craft beer. In response, Anheuser-Busch InBev and SABMiller, the two biggest brewers in the world, are discussing a merger that would be scrutinized by antitrust regulators. Source: The New York Times, September 16, 2015 How would a merger benefit the two big brewers? Under what circumstances would the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenge the merger? A merger would benefit the two big brewers because O A. the price of beer would fall close to the price in a perfectly competitive market and sales would increase O B. average total cost would increase but price would increase by more than average total cost O C. the price of beer could rise close to the monopoly price and economic profit would increase O D. many craft brewers would be forced out of the market The Federal Trade Commission would challenge the merger if O A. it increases the HHI O B. the HHI is less than 1,500 O C. the HHI is…
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Suppose that a small town has seven burger shops whose respective shares of the local hamburger market are (as percentages of all hamburgers sold): 26 percent, 24 percent, 20 percent, 12 percent, 9 percent, 6 percent, and 3 percent. Instructions: Enter your answers as a whole number. a. What is the four-firm concentration ratio of the hamburger industry in this town? Book percent Print b. What is the Herfindahl index for the hamburger industry in this town? erences c. If the top three sellers combine to form a single firm, what would happen to the four-firm concentration ratio and to the Herfindahl index? Four-firm concentration ratio = percent Herfindahl index =
11. Suppose there is a duopoly of two identical firms, A and B, facing a market inverse demand of P = 140 – 0.5Q, and cost functions of CA = 20QA and Cg = 20QB respectively. a. Find the Cournot-Nash equilibrium and profit for each firm. b. Suppose that A acts as the leader in a Stackelberg model and B responds. What are the respective quantities and profits of each firm now? Is it advantageous to move first? c. If the firms were able to collude, how much additional profit could they earn if they switch from simple single pricing to perfect price discrimination? d. Graph and label equilibria on the inverse demand.