1. Consider the following dynamic gameDLRC32PLRC3,3,2 0,0,0 4,4,0 0,0,1→1,1,1Find all the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.

## Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in a Dynamic GameThe game you presented involves two players,…

Answered: 1. Consider the following dynamic game…

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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Question 5 Consider the following Extended Form Game: A' (1,1) A P2 B' O [(B, B')} (2,3) O ((B.(B',A')). (B.(B¹, B'))) P1 A' What is the set of Nash Equilibria? O {(B.(A', B)), (B,(B', B'))) (4,5) B O ((B.(A'A')). (B.(A, B')). (B,(B,A')), (B,(B', B'))} P2 B' (6,7)
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1. Consider the following dynamic game D LR C 3 2 P LR C 3,3,2 0,0,0 4,4,0 0,0,1 →1,1,1 Find all the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.