Economics (7th Edition) (What's New in Economics)
7th Edition
ISBN: 9780134738321
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O'Brien
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 7, Problem 7.3.10PA
To determine
Identifying adverse selection and moral hazard problem.
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Briefly explain what it means for information to be asymmetric.
a. What is Moral Hazard?
b. Identify and briefly explain three methods that insurance companies could use to off-set the moral hazard associated with their industry.
c. What is Adverse Selection?
What would explain why moral hazard might not occur after the large gains in health insurance coverage?
What is moral hazard?
Chapter 7 Solutions
Economics (7th Edition) (What's New in Economics)
Ch. 7 - Prob. 7.1.1RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.1.2RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.1.3RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.1.4PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.1.5PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.1.6PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.1RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.2RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.3RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.4RQ
Ch. 7 - Prob. 7.2.5PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.6PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.7PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.8PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.2.9PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.1RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.2RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.3RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.4RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.5PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.6PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.7PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.8PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.9PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.10PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.11PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.12PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.13PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.14PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.3.15PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.1RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.2RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.3RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.4RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.5RQCh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.6PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.7PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.8PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.9PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.10PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.11PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.12PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.13PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.4.14PACh. 7 - Prob. 7.1CTE
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Similar questions
- What is the significance when it comes to moral hazard to show it's efficient function of a medical market?arrow_forwardConsider the model of the market for lemons from Chapter 22. Suppose that there are two types of used cars — good ones and lemons — and that sellers know which type of car they have. Buyers do not know which type of car a seller has. The fraction of used cars of each type is 21 and buyers know this. Let’s suppose that a seller who has a good car values it at $10,000 and a seller with a lemon values the lemon at $5,000. A seller is willing to sell his car for any price greater than or equal to his value for the car; the seller is not willing to sell the car at a price below the value of the car. Buyers’ values for good cars and lemons are $14,000 and $8,000, respectively. As in Chapter 22 we will assume that buyers are risk-neutral; that is, they are willing to pay their expected value of a car. (a) Is there an equilibrium in the used-car market in which all types of cars are sold? Briefly explain.(b) Is there an equilibrium in the used-car market in which only lemons are sold? Briefly…arrow_forwardThe lecture mentions that diminishing marginal utility applies to the consumption of money as well as the consumption of certain food. Can you give another example where diminishing marginal utility applies? Can you think of any example where diminishing marginal utility does not apply? From utility theory, the demand for insurance depends on the level of risk aversion (i.e. how much you hate uncertainty), the cost of insurance (i.e. if it is within your willingness to pay), as well as wealth. Can you think of anything else that affects demand for insurance? One of the predictions of prospect theory is that we tend to be overly concerned with relatively small risk. Can you think of any example (besides those given in the lecture) that either speaks to this or is an exception?arrow_forward
- What are adverse selection and moral hazard?arrow_forwardDefine the difference between moral hazard and adverse selection using an example. .arrow_forwardWhat is Moral Hazard, and how does moral hazard affect the likelihood a population demands medical care and the total demand for medical care?arrow_forward
- Consider the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arising from asymmetric information: a. Consider government-provided health insurance, such as OHIP in Ontario, and government-mandated health insurance, such as Obamacare in the United States. Which problem are such programs intended to combat: adverse selection or moral hazard? Very briefly characterize the tradeoff between adverse selection and moral hazard as it relates to health insurance public policy.arrow_forwardCyclists travel faster on their bicycles when wearing helmets. Is this an example of adverse selection or moral hazard?arrow_forwardIf the demand curve is steeper for particular health services the moral hazard is less ? True or false Explain briefly.arrow_forward
- Adverse selection is good ? like the The Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) deals with the problem of adverse selection by using the power of the government to fine individuals who do not sign up for health insurance. do you think it brings benefits or not ?arrow_forwardIn the RAND study, two plans had full coverage for spending within the hospital, but one had a $150 deductible for ambulatory care. Th e plan with the ambulatory care deductible had a lower probability of hospital admission (0.115) per year than did the plan with full coverage for everything (0.128), even though both plans covered hospital care fully. (See Table 5.4. Page 120 of the Textbook: Health Economics Charles) What does this tell you about the use of hospital and ambulatory. Table 5.4. Hospital use in HIS Plan Admissionsper Year Inpatient Cost(1984 Dollars) C = 0 0.128 409 C=0.5 0.092 450 C=0.95 0.099 315 $150 individual deductible 0.115 373arrow_forwardIn the mid-1990s, the state of New Jersey revised its rules for the individual insurance market and began requiring that insurers charge the same premiums for the same coverage to all applicants. Assuming that insurers had previously used medical underwriting, which of the following is a predictable consequence of adverse selection? 1) Insurance becomes less attractive to the healthiest individuals, so fewer of them buy it 2) Insurers’ average costs of providing coverage increase because of a changing risk pool 3) The average age of those buying in the individual market goes up 4) All of the abovearrow_forward
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