Find the probability density function for the price per share that the investor will pay.

Question

A firm's revenue R is stochastically related to the effort exerted by its employee. Effort is a continuous variable. The employee can choose any level of effort e E [0, ). The choice of effort affects revenue so that: E(R|e) = e and Var(R|e) = 1 %3D where E(R|e) and V ar(R|e) denote the expected value and variance, respectively, of rev- enue when the employee exerts effort level e. The employer cannot observe the level of effort exerted by the employee. The employer wants to design a wage contract w based on the revenue and considers only contracts of the form: w-α+ βR and so the employee is guaranteed a payment a and then a bonus payment ßR which de- pends on revenue. The employee is a risk-averse expected utility maximiser. A contract w gives expected utility: Eu(w\e) = E(w\e)-eV ar(w]e) – c(e) where E(wle) and Var(wle) denote the expected value and variance of the contract, re- spectively, conditional on effort e, p is a parameter of risk aversion, and c(e) denotes the disutility of…

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Question

Chapter 6, Problem 87SE

a.

To determine

Find the probability density function for the price per share that the investor will pay.

b.

To determine

Find the expected cost per share that the investor will pay.

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A firm's revenue R is stochastically related to the effort exerted by its employee. Effort is a continuous variable. The employee can choose any level of effort e E [0, ). The choice of effort affects revenue so that: E(R|e) = e and Var(R|e) = 1 %3D where E(R|e) and V ar(R|e) denote the expected value and variance, respectively, of rev- enue when the employee exerts effort level e. The employer cannot observe the level of effort exerted by the employee. The employer wants to design a wage contract w based on the revenue and considers only contracts of the form: w-α+ βR and so the employee is guaranteed a payment a and then a bonus payment ßR which de- pends on revenue. The employee is a risk-averse expected utility maximiser. A contract w gives expected utility: Eu(w\e) = E(w\e)-eV ar(w]e) – c(e) where E(wle) and Var(wle) denote the expected value and variance of the contract, re- spectively, conditional on effort e, p is a parameter of risk aversion, and c(e) denotes the disutility of…

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