Microeconomics
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781259915727
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 5.A, Problem 3ARQ
To determine
Is the given statement is true or falls, why?
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Q6
c and D ( wrong)
Question 6
Logrolling refers to
O 1) choosing political platforms to appeal to special interests.
2) trading votes to gain support for legislation.
3) choosing political platforms to appeal to the "middle-of-the-road" voter.
4) gathering votes by pretending to support policies that appeal to voters.
5) c and d
urgent
1.15. Consider the Supreme Court as an electorate of 9 members thatvotes yes-or-no on a variety of issues. It is customary for this electorateto use the simple majority method, and since 9 is an odd number, no tiescan result when no justices are absent. Imagine the following alternativemethod for determining Supreme Court decisions. The decision is affirmative whenever at least 3 of the first 5 justices vote to affirm. Otherwisethe decision is negative. This is just the bloc voting method, where thejustices form blocs of size 5, 1, 1, 1, and 1. (This method emulates whatwould occur if the first 5 justices were to agree to always vote as a blocand to decide among themselves how the bloc should rule.)(a) Is this method anonymous?(b) Is this method neutral?(c) Is this method monotone?(d) If you were one of the 4 justices not among the first 5, why wouldyou complain about this voting method?
1.14. Consider a variation on the idea of a weighted voting system, inwhich one or more voters is given a negative weight. Show that sucha system is not monotone. If a voter knows that the method assigns anegative weight to her vote, how will she be inclined to cast her ballot?
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- Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Assuming the following voter preferences: True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 4. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D. If the tax in C induces 100% compliance (everyone votes), did this tax…arrow_forward1.12. Consider a weighted voting method with 5 voters assigned weights17, 15, 14, 12, and 7, respectively, with a simple majority of the weightedvotes sufficient for victory. Explain why this method is in effect the(unweighted) simple majority method.arrow_forward4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?arrow_forward
- Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [ Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. If a candidate is favored [ Choose ] when compared separately with every other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. If a candidate wins an [ Choose] election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election.arrow_forwardSuppose that friends Jennifer, Stephanie, and Megan cannot agree on how much to spend for a bouquet of flowers to send to a person who allowed them to use her beach house for the weekend. Jennifer wants to buy a moderately priced bouquet, Stephanie wants to buy an expensive bouquet, and Megan wants to buy a very expensive bouquet. Assuming no paradox of voting, majority voting will result in the decision to buy Multiple Choice an inexpensive bouquet. a very expensive bouquet. a moderately priced bouquet. an expensive bouquet. Barrow_forwardEach one has ONE Senator who votes for their state and is elected only by the voters in their own state. Each Senator's vote is equal in the voting process. There are three projects being considered and each will only bring revenue into the one State in which it is built BUT all three projects, if built, will be built with Taxes paid by ALL of the population of all 5 states. District 1 is not considering a project at this time. District 2 is mostly urban and they want to build a Football stadium to attract tourists. District 3 is not considering a project at this time. District 4 wants to build a Space Exploration Research Center. District 5 wants to build an airport. The relevant Benefit (positive number) and Cost (negative number) to each district details are below: District I District II District III District IV District V O Regulatory Capture Logrolling Stadium ($) -30 80 -30 -30 -30 The Scenario outlined above is commonly known as: Kleptocracy Rent Seeking Airport ($) -25 -25 -25…arrow_forward
- 4.12. A social choice function satisfies the bottom criterion if, whenever a candidate is not at the bottom of the preference list of any voter,that candidate is a winner.(a) Does the plurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(b) Does the antiplurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(c) Explain why it is impossible for a social choice function with three ormore candidates to satisfy both the bottom criterion and the Paretocriterion.arrow_forwardIn a congressional district somewhere in the U.S., a new representative is being elected. The voters all have one-dimensional political views that can be neatly arrayed on a left-right spectrum. We can define the ”location” of a citizen’s political views in the following way. The citizen with the most extreme left-wing views is said to be at point 0 and the citizen with the most extreme right-wing views is said to be at point 1. If a citizen has views that are to the right of the views of the fraction x of the state’s population, that citizen’s views are said to be located at point x. There are two candidates for the congressional seat and they are forced to publicly state their own political position simultaneously on the zero-one left-right scale. 1.a Suppose voters always vote for the candidate whose stated position is nearest to their own views and suppose each candidate cares only about getting as many votes as possible. In equilibrium, what will be the two candidates’ positions?…arrow_forward1. A city has three equal-sized groups of people: (1) Type A people consistently prefer more public school expenditure; (2) Type B people prefer high levels of public school expenditure to low levels, and they prefer low levels to medium levels; (3) Type C people most prefer medium levels to low levels, and they prefer low levels to high levels. Will majority voting generate consistent outcomes in this case? (Hint: you should check if there are cycles in outcomes by changing the order of voting) A.True B. False 2. Suppose Florida government has asked you to design and evaluate the effectiveness of an education voucher program. What is wrong with simply comparing the educational performance of those receiving vouchers with those who do not receive vouchers? Explain.arrow_forward
- - = 1.8. Consider a population of voters uniformly distributed along the ideological spectrum from left (x = 0) to right (x = 1). Each of the candidates for a single office simultaneously chooses a cam- paign platform (i.e., a point on the line between x 0 and x 1). The voters observe the candidates' choices, and then each voter votes for the candidate whose platform is closest to the voter's position on the spectrum. If there are two candidates and they choose platforms x₁ = .3 and x2 = .6, for example, then all voters to the left of x .45 vote for candidate 1, all those to the right vote for candidate 2, and candidate 2 wins the elec- tion with 55 percent of the vote. Suppose that the candidates care only about being elected—they do not really care about their platforms at all! If there are two candidates, what is the pure- strategy Nash equilibrium? If there are three candidates, exhibit a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (Assume that any candidates who choose the same platform…arrow_forwardurgent 1.11. Because ties are possible in the United States Senate, the Constitution provides for the vice president to cast a tie-breaking vote. One cantherefore think of the Senate as a body with 101 voters, 100 of whomare senators and one of whom is the vice president. The rules dictatethat the vice president votes only to break ties and not otherwise. Is thissystem anonymous?arrow_forward4.10. A social choice function satisfies the weak Pareto criterion if,whenever every voter places one candidate above another, say rankingcandidate A over candidate B, then candidate B cannot be the uniquewinner. (This differs from the Pareto property owing to the words “theunique”.)(a) Explain why any method that satisfies Pareto also satisfies weakPareto.(b) Explain why the antiplurality method satisfies weak Pareto.(c) Explain why the agenda method violates weak Pareto.arrow_forward
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