Microeconomics
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781259915727
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 21, Problem 5DQ
To determine
Economies of scale and merger of firms.
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1.Briefly state the basic characteristics of pure competition, pure monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. Under which of these market classifications does each of the following most accurately fit? (a) a supermarket in your hometown; (b) the steel industry; (c) a Kansas wheat farm; (d) the commercial bank in which you or your family has an account; (e) the automobile industry. In each case, justify your classification. LO1
Question 1.Assume there are only two art auction companies who account for 100% of all the sales of 19thCentury impressionist master work paintings in the world. Assume that each company buys thiskind of painting and then resells the paintings at monthly auctions. Ignoring the question of anylaws that might apply, describe what economic arrangement would maximize the twocompanies’ total profits? Show with supply and demand curves what profit they would makefrom this arrangement and what societal welfare loss, if any, results from it.
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- Suppose there are two firms in an industry and the inverse demand function for the industry is: P = 45 - 20 Assume that the MC functions for the two firms are: MC1 = 15 MC2 = 12 What is the price under Courbet model? O 15 O 24 O 30 O 36 O 21arrow_forwardThe inverse demand for a homogenous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 10-Q where Q=Q1 + Q2. The cost structure for the two firms, respectively, are C(Q1) = 4Q1 and C2(Q2) = 2Q2. Suppose Firm 2 is the leader. What is the equilibrium profit for the leader? O 7.5 O 10.5 O 12.5 O 0.5 O 0.25arrow_forwardMarket Share of Firms in Industry 2 30 10 25 10 10 20 The table shows market shares of firms in hypothetical industries. Assume these are distinct industries with no buyer-seller relationships or competition among them. A merger between Firm 2 and Firm 3 in Alpha would be a Industry Alpha Beta Kappa Delta 1 30 80 25 20 Select one: O a. conglomerate merger. O b. diagonal merger. O c. vertical merger. O d. horizontal merger. 32532 20 20 4 20 3 25 20 5 1 6 1arrow_forward
- 18. Answer the next question based on the payoff matrix for a two-firm oligopoly where the numbers represent the firms' respective profits given each of their pricing strategies: FIRM Y O $ 800,000 O $1,000,000 O $1,450,000 Strategies: High-price If both firms collude to maximize joint profits, O $1,250,000 FIRM X High-price X = $625,000 Y = $625,000 Low-price X = $275,000 Y = $725,000 Low Price X = $725,000 Y = $275,000 X = $400,000 Y = $400,000 tal profits for the two firms will be:arrow_forwardConsider a market with 3 Cournot firms producing a homogeneous product. Consumer demand is given by P = 130 - Q. Each firm's total costs are given by C = f + 10g, where f represents fixed costs. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 merge and that after the merger, the merged firm has fixed costsof af with 1 < a< 2. Under which condition is this merger %3D profitable for the merging firms? O a. a< 2- 200/f O b. None of the options given are correct Oc a<2- 100/f O d. a <2- 150/f O e. a<2- 50/farrow_forwardFill in the columns in the following table. (Enter your responses as whole numbers.) TFC TVC $5 $0 5 3 q 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 9 16 25 36 ԼՈ MC P = MR $5 5 5 5 S LO 5 40 5 5 TR $0 TC $5 Profit $-5arrow_forward
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