Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134492049
Author: Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, John List
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 18, Problem 4P
To determine
Equilibrium in an ultimatum game where rejection leads to the responder and the proposer receiving
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Students have asked these similar questions
Nicolaus I Bernoulli offers his friend Pierre Rémond de Montmort a game where they
need to repeatedly toss a fair ducat until they get a head for the first time. The game
stops then, and they count the number n of coin tosses it took to get the desired
outcome, and Montmort gets 2^n ducats. Assume that Montmort's utility function is
u(w)=w^0.14. How much should Montmort pay to play this game?
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Chapter 18 Solutions
Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
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