Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134492049
Author: Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, John List
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 17, Problem 3Q
To determine
Explanation of an English auction.
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Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
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- This question is from game theoryarrow_forward10 Use the expected value information to illustrate how having more bidders in an oral auction will likely result in a higher winning bid.arrow_forwardQ3 Consider the following three-player normal form game (Player 3 is the page player): Player 3 A в Player 2 Player 2 A в A B 1,2, 3 в 2,3,1 Player 1 A Player 1 A 2, 1, 3 3, 2, 1 3, 2, 1 1,2, 3 в 1,3, 2 3, 1,2 For each player, strategies are A and B. a) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the above game. Assume now that the above game is played sequentially, with Player 3 moving first, Player 1 moving second, and Player 2 moving third. b) Write down the game tree. c) For each player, list all the available pure strategies. d) Find the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and compare it with the equilibrium outcome you found in subquestion a). Comment.arrow_forward
- Consider the following situation: five individuals are participating in an auction for an old bicycle used by a famous cyclist. The table below provides the bidders' valuations of the cycle. The auctioneer starts the bid at an offer price far above the bidders' values and lowers the price in increments until one of the bidders accepts the offer. Bidder Value ($) Roberto 750 Claudia 700 Mario 650 Bradley 600 Michelle 550 What is the optimal strategy of each player in this case? Who will win the auction if each bidder places his or her optimal bid? If Claudia wins the auction, how much surplus will she earn?arrow_forwardIn game theory, what is a subgame? What is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium? If possible, could you please provide an example? Thank you!arrow_forwardDefine game theory.arrow_forward
- What Is E-Reverse Auctions?arrow_forwardConsider the following simultaneous move game where player 1 has two types. Player 2 does not know if he is playing with type a player 1 or type b player 1. Player 2 C D Player 1 A 12,9 3,6 B 6,0 6,9 C D A 0,9 3,6 B 6,0 6,9 Type a Player 1 Prob = 2/3 Type b Player 1 Prob = 1/3 Find the all the possible Bayesian Nash Equilibriums (BNE) of this game.arrow_forwardWrite the game below in normal form and find all Nash equilibria. C 2. Write the game below in normal form and find all Nash equilibria. जल P = 1/1535 Nature ताल P = 1/3 P1 A (3,6) P1 B P2 B C2 P2 Pz Pz (0,3) ✓ (9,0) (3,3) ✓ (0, 6) (-3,3) ✓ (9,6) Х (3,0) (-3, 12)arrow_forward
- Suppose China and the US are deciding whether to join an international agreement to mitigate climate change. The matrix below contains payoffs that represent each country’s net benefit from their decisions. Use this information to answer Question 24. CHINA USA Join Agreement Do Not Join Agreement Join Agreement (100,100) (0,125) Do Not Join Agreement (125,0) (25,25) [24] What does each country decide to do in a Nash equilibrium? AND What is the efficient outcome? Nash: Efficient:arrow_forwardDiscrete All-Pay Auction: In Section 6.1.4 we introduced a version of an all- pay auction that worked as follows: Each bidder submits a bid. The highest bidder gets the good, but all bidders pay their bids. Consider an auction in which player 1 values the item at 3 while player 2 values the item at 5. Each player can bid either 0, 1, or 2. If player i bids more than player j then i wins the good and both pay. If both players bid the same amount then a coin is tossed to determine who gets the good, but again both pay. a. Write down the game in matrix form. Which strategies survive IESDS? b. Find the Nash equilibria for this game.arrow_forwardWhat is the link between game theory and market structures? Which market structure is game theory more linked to?arrow_forward
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