Econ Micro (book Only)
6th Edition
ISBN: 9781337408066
Author: William A. McEachern
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Question
Chapter 16, Problem 5P
To determine
whether the media voter gets his/her most preferred outcome always.
Concept Introduction:
There exists a theorem of median voters that states that “a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred by the median voter". The concept of median voters carry a theorem as stated above. The median voter concept explains why politicians follow the same pattern of campaigning and platforms to prove their thoughts rather to win the majority votes they must focus on the median voter.
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Question 2 A problem with the median voter outcome is that it does not take into account intensity of preferences. Suppose that the government decided to give multiple votes to people with strong preferences, pro or con. Does this solve the problem? Why or why not?
Problem 2. The planning committee for a renewable energy trade show is trying to decide what city to hold their next show in. The votes are shown below.
Numbers of Voters
9
19
11
8
1st choice
Buffalo
Atlanta
Chicago
Buffalo
2nd choice
Atlanta
Buffalo
Buffalo
Chicago
3rd choice
Chicago
Chicago
Atlanta
Atlanta
How many voters voted in this election?
How many votes are needed for a majority? A plurality?
Find the winner under the plurality method.
Find the winner under the Borda Count Method.
Find the winner under the Plurality with Elimination method.
Find the winner under the Pairwise Comparison Voting method.
with largest remall
6. In Table 13.15, we again show the same results from the Oslo district in the 2005
Norwegian elections. Answer the following questions. As before, you should ignore the
"others" category.
a. Copy Table 13.15. Imagine that the seventeen seats in Oslo are to be allocated according
to the d'Hondt divisor method. Show the different quotients that are calculated when
you divide each party's vote total by the d'Hondt divisors in your table. How many seats
does each party obtain?
b. Now repeat the process using the Sainte-Laguë divisor method and then the modified
Sainte-Laguë divisor method. Note that you will need to change the integers used to
estimate the quotients. How many seats does each party obtain under these divisor
systems?
c. Are there any differences if you examine the seat allocations from the two quota systems
and the three divisor systems? Does one method produce a more proportional or fairer
outcome in your opinion than another?
TABLE 13.15
Legislative…
Knowledge Booster
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