Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Question
Chapter 15A, Problem 9E
To determine
To describe:The auction design is more like private placement of corporate newly issued bonds and IPO stock.
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hello so i got a question from my teacher and wanna make sure its correct
here is the question:
A company is considering the strategy to further expand its activity into a foreign market it recently accessed. The foreign government has announced that a new industrial site will be offered for sale on a competitive tender basis, the site going to the company making the highest bid. The multinational has a good experience with this type of auctions, and – based on its assessment – it decides that if it is to bid for the site, it will place a bid of £750 million. In the past, 70 percent of the company’s bids for such type of projects have been successful.
The marketing department indicates that expansions of the multinational’s foreign market activity can be expected to generate revenue of around £1,500 million if demand turns out to be high, versus only £500 million if demand turns out to be low. Data scientists have indicated that the probability of high demand is 0.60.
If the company is…
There are 3 bidders with valuations that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
In equilibrium, what will Bidder 1 bid in a first-price auction if its valuation is 0.7? Round your answer to
two decimal places.
Explain how the strategic choice of reservation price can raise expected profitability yet threaten efficiency in an English auction.
Chapter 15A Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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- You are one of five risk-neutral bidders participating in an independent private values auction. Each bidder perceives that all other bidders’ valuations for the item are evenly distributed between $10,000 and $30,000. For each of the following auction types, determine your optimal bidding strategy if you value the item at $22,000. a. First-price, sealed-bid auction. b. Dutch auction. c. Second-price, sealed-bid auction. d. English auction.arrow_forwardA4 The Suboptimality of Lower-Than-Cost Reserve Prices: A seller chooses to sell an object by means of a Vickrey auction. If trade occurs, the seller incurs a positive opportunity cost (i.e. c > 0). There are n > 1 bidders participating in the auction. Suppose that the all of the bidders play according to a symmetric and increasing BNE strategy. Show that the seller is always better off by setting the reserve price equal to her cost (i.e. r = c) than by setting the reserve price below her cost (i.e. r < c).arrow_forwardYou are one of five risk-neutral bidders participating in an independent private values auction. Each bidder perceives that bidders' valuations for the item are evenly distributed between $20,000 and $50,000. For each of the following auction t determine your optimal bidding strategy if you value the item at $35,000. a. First-price, sealed-bid auction. O Bid $20,00. O Bid $50,00. O Bid $35,00. O Bid $32,000 b. Dutch auction O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $20,000, and then yell "Minel". O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $35.000, and then yell "Mine!" O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $32,000, and then yell "Mine!" O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $50,000, and then yell "Mine!". C. ond-price, sealed-bid auction O Bid $50,00. O Bid $35.000 O Bid $32,00. b. Dutch auction. O Let the auctioneer continue to lower the price until it reaches $20,000, and then yell…arrow_forward
- Analyze the pure Nash equilibrium and mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in the following manufacturer–distributor coordination game. How would you recommend restructuring the game to secure higher expected profit for the manufacturer?arrow_forwardAIR, an airline company, used to deal only in derivatives of futures and swaps to hedge its jet fuel market risk. However, in the mid2003, AIR started trading in speculative derivative options and took a bullish view of the jet fuel market.The company predicted correctly but by the end of 2003, AIR revised its strategy to a bearish stance.The CEO signed contracts with several banks, buying put options and selling call options, but the prices soared above the strike priceof the call, and AIR faced a large deficit.1. Explain how AIR could have floored the losses through an adequate risk management procedureDespite mark to market losses of $30 million by mid 2004, the CEO increased AIR exposure.In addition, the trading was not disclosed in the financial statements, and AIR accounted for the options at intrinsic value, ignoringthe time value component.From March 2003, AIR started trading options on its own account.AIR was unable to meet some of the margin calls, resulting in the company…arrow_forwardConsider a sealed-bid auction in which the seller draws one of the N bids at random. The buyer whose bid was drawn wins the auction and pays the amount bid. Assume that buyer valuations follow a uniform(0,1) distribution. 1. What is the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy b(v)?2. What is the seller’s expected revenue?3. Why doesn’t this auction pay the seller the same revenue as the four standard auctions? That is, why doesn’t the revenue equivalence theorem apply here?arrow_forward
- How to solve this question? Consider an antique auction where bidders have independent private values. There are two bidders, each of whom perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $100 and $1,000. One of the bidders is Sue, who knows her own valuation is $200. What is Sue's optimal bidding strategy in a Dutch auction?arrow_forwardSuppose that Alpha Inc., Richardson Industries, and K-Tek are the only three firms interested in a plot of land on the outskirts of town. The lot is being auctioned by a second-price sealed-bid auction. Alpha values the lot at $17,000, Richardson at $20,000, and K-Tek at $10,000. Each bidding firm's consumer surplus is CS=v₁ - P if it wins the auction and 0 if it loses. The values are private. What is each bidder's optimal bid? Who wins the auction, and what price does that firm pay? Richardson's optimal bid is $ and K-Tek's is $ Alpha's optimal bid is $ whole numbers.) (Enter your responses asarrow_forwarda. Consider the game faced by the British and Dutch managers when both are given contracts that compensate them with (1)/(2) of 1% of revenue. The strategic form game is shown. Find the Nash equilibria. b. Now consider the game between the British and Dutch shareholders as to what kind of contracts to give their managers. Assume that they simultaneously choose between a contract that gives the manager 1% of profit and one that gives him (1)/(2) of 1% of revenue. Assume, as before, that the shareholders’ payoff is profit (and we ignore the trivial amount that they pay to their managers). After a pair of contracts is selected, the two contracts are revealed to both managers, and the managers then choose between supply levels of low, moderate, and high. Find all SPNE.arrow_forward
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