Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 15A, Problem 5E
To determine
To ascertain: The value based on the given condition, consider individual as an auctioneer-seller, design an auction that reduces strategic underbidding.
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Chapter 15A Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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