Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134492049
Author: Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, John List
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 13, Problem 5Q
To determine
Modelling of “prisoner’s dilemma” as a “tragedy of commons” problem.
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Chapter 13 Solutions
Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
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